Regarding the Nature of the Object of the
Moral Act According to St. Thomas Aquinas
My remarks this afternoon are drawn from a larger essay, which I can't plausibly deliver in its entirety. But because we are, as the sign outside the dining hall a couple days ago put it, the "Thomistics", I will presuppose your familiarity with much of the context, and try to abbreviate my way into the issue I want to discuss.
The context for my remarks derives from my concern with the account of the moral object given by Doctors Finnis, Grisez, and Boyle. Many of you are well-acquainted with their account. In particular, in the January 2001 issue of The Thomist, they argue for the moral permissibility of craniatomy, which involves the direct crushing of the skull of the fetus. As they put it in that article, "The morally relevant description of the act would not include killing the baby". On their account this is not a wrongful act by reason of its object, because they hold that the object may exclude the physical species of the act as well as any per se natural effects of the act. In other words, on their view only the ratio of the preferred feature of the act is properly speaking included within the moral object, while the physical character of the act and its per se effects need not be included within the object. The object of the moral act thus is reduced to a logical proposal, excluding that integral nature of the act which is the necessary condition for the causality of any of its features.
So, in their Thomist article, Drs. Boyle, Finnis, and Grisez, introduce a whole series of examples, whose structure and point are predominantly the same. In these examples, intention is construed not as embracing natural limits which import "plusses" and "minuses" into one's intention from nature, but instead as a purely logical entity or proposal.(1) As they put the issue regarding craniatomy "the baby's death is a side effect of changing the dimensions of its skull." Similarly, they argue that when one knowingly blows up an aircraft carrying passengers in order to obtain insurance payment on the plane, that "the passengers' death, being outside the proposal, is not intended by the bomber". It does seem to me that by this logic, someone could plausibly light my cigarette with a flamethrower, and identify the object as that of lighting a cigarette, because the part of the flame that lights the cigarette is not the part of the flame that incinerates me. Compared to the danger of this account of the moral object, the danger of secondhand smoke pales in comparison--here we are, as it were, talking about first-person smoking.
By contrast, St. Thomas writes in Sth I-II.20.1.ad 1: "The exterior action is the object of the will, inasmuch as it is proposed to the will by the reason, as good apprehended and ordained by the reason" ("Dicendum quod actus exterior est obiectum voluntatis, inquantum proponitur voluntati a ratione ut quoddam bonum apprehensum et ordinatum per rationem"). One grants that the physical character of the act is only one of the causal elements in determining the moral object: as the saying goes, the man who pushes an elderly woman out of the way of an oncoming bus, and the man who pushes an elderly woman into the way of an oncoming bus, are both men who push elderly women around. The physical character of the act is not the only consideration. But it cannot be left out. So the object of the will is the exterior act itself under a certain ratio, but nonetheless truly and wholly present. The physical character of what is done--the integral nature of the act--may not be excluded. Else, all we need do in order to change the nature of the object of one and the same act is merely to change our descriptions.
The upshot of this is that one must beware of angelism in regard to the nature of the moral object. While the moral species cannot be reduced to the physical species, neither can the nature or physical species of the act be excluded as one of the essential causal elements in determining the moral species. There is a similarity here with St. Thomas's teaching about abstraction of the common nature--the abstractio formae totius. In this abstraction the common nature is abstracted not with individuated matter (this flesh and these bones) but rather with the common matter of the definition (flesh and bones in general), and it is this whole nature that is formal with respect to (and predicated of) the individual. Similarly, in the case of moral action the essential matter of the act must always be included in the moral object.
Because of this concern regarding the moral object, it did not escape my eye that Doctors Grisez, Finnis, and Boyle often refer to the case of defense as a paridigmatic instance in which the tradition sanctions treating the clear and direct physical character of the act as a mere "side-effect". Responding to criticisms of craniatomy as "direct" rather than "indirect" killing they write in the same Thomist piece mentioned above that:
this difference does not show that craniotomy is direct killing. A counter-example makes this clear. All those acts of self-defense of the kind that Aquinas shows need involve no intent to kill and no direct killing are nonetheless performed "upon" the person killed.
Likewise, in his work Aquinas Finnis invokes the principle of double-effect even in order to explain the effort to blow up Hitler. Now, it has long been my sense that deontologists need to apply the principle of double-effect even to get up in the morning. So there is a vested interest in seeing whether this great device of idealizing logicism may not be reigned in to more appropriate bounds. But there are great minds in the commentatorial tradition who do seem to speak of the lethality in a directly lethal act of self-defense as a consequence or side-effect.
In particular, and although we do not have the time to go through the text in detail today, the commentary of Cajetan on the article in the Summa that addresses lethal defense by private parties--II-II.64.7--seems to me to suggest such a position. This famed account of double-effect given by Cajetan(2) seems to suggest this reading by assimilating all lethal killing in just defense to the idea that "that which as consequence follows from the necessity of the end does not fall under intention, but arises existing outside the intention" ("Id autem, quod consequitur ex necessitate finis, non cadit sub intentione, sed praeter intentionem existens emergit"). Cajetan writes that "the end and the means to the end fall under intention"--which in one particular sense is true--while also holding that the private citizen in defense "does not intend to kill that he may be saved" ("non intendit occidere, ut seipsum salvet"). He also expressly compares the public officer, who on his account may choose to kill as a means, with the private citizen who apparently may kill only by way of consequence, but neither as an end nor as a means.
Yet although death is sometimes merely a consequence of a defense, there are other defenses which can be made only through deliberately choosing a lethal means because and insofar as it is lethal. When an act is directly chosen because of the proportion of lethal means to the protection of the innocent such lethal defense does not in any ordinary way seem to be a "consequence". All these factors turn the mind to the question about the nature of intention in the case of deliberately lethal defense.
Now, the phrase from Sth.II.-II.64.7.resp. that "it is not lawful for a man to intend killing a man in self-defense" ("Illicitum est quod homo intendat occidere hominem ut seipsum defendat") often is taken to refer to the wrongness of a private citizen choosing to kill an aggressor as a means of just defense.(3) For this to be true, however, Thomas must be construed as not using "intentio" to refer primarily to the end, not using the term as he does in the prima secundae where he writes that (Sth I-II.13.4.resp.) "Just as intention regards the end, so does choice regard the means." Because if Thomas is referring to the wrongness of the private citizen harboring or enacting the simple intention to kill as an end, this in itself would not rule out the killing solely as a proportionate means of defense. The following words of Thomas at the beginning of Sth.II-II.64.7.resp. are critical:
Nothing hinders one act from having two effects, only one of which is intended, while the other is beside the intention. Now moral acts take their species according to what is intended, and not according to what is beside the intention, since this is accidental...(4)
Now it might be argued that if Thomas referred these words (that "Moral acts take their species according to what is intended--"Morales autem actus recipiunt speciem secundum id quod intenditur") to "intentio" in the proper sense of the willing of the end, then he would be asserting that moral acts receive moral species only from the end and not from the means. But far from counting as the position of Thomas, it might be thought instead that this approximates the account of Abelard!
Yet, to the contrary: the above-quoted lines of St. Thomas are contextualized by the datum that the species derived from the end contains the species derived from the object when that object is naturally ordered to it, and elsewise the object is itself a separate act with a distinct means-end structure of its own. The unit of currency of St. Thomas's analysis is the instance in which the object is naturally proportioned to the end, as the per se precedes the per accidens.
There are only two cases: either 1)the object is by its nature ordered to the end, or 2)it is not. In the first case the species derived from the end contains the species derived from the object. Here the species of the object is an essential determination of the more formal and defining species derived from the end, and what it contributes is wholly contained within the species derived from the end. Thomas compares the species derived from the end in this case to a genus and the species derived from the object to a specific difference. But the specific difference is contained within the genus--man, though rational, is an animal. The point is not that the species derived from the object adds nothing, but that what it adds is contained within the species derived from the end and so is not outside this species, not in this particular sense praeter intentionem. Hence St. Thomas writes in Sth.I-II.18.7.resp.: "if the object be of itself ordained to the end, one of these differences is an essential determination of the other. Wherefore one of these species will be contained under the other."(5) He continues, arguing: "From all this it follows that the specific difference derived from the end, is more general; and that the difference derived from an object which of itself is ordained to that end, is a specific difference in relation to the former."(6)
In the second case, in which the object by its nature is not ordered to the end, it transpires that the object is itself a separate means-end act structure that is accidental vis a vis the further end: just as adultery is accidental to theft. So where the object is not naturally ordered to the end, one is looking at two acts and two moral species--one for adultery and one for theft--although since the one act is intended because of the other, we can say with Thomas that the malefactor who commits adultery in order to steal is more thief than adulterer. In turn, this separate means-end act structure is either itself one in which the means is naturally ordered to the end or not. But if it is the former, then the species derived from the end contains the species derived from the object. This is not Abelardian. The problem with Abelard's position consists in its propensity to deny the natural moral teleology of each act, looking instead only to more remote ends or even consequences of an act.
A relation and proportion to the end is included in the object of the external act (STh I-II, q. 18, a. 4, ad 2)--by nature the end is most formal. There simply is no other case than one of the two options: the object is naturally ordered to the end (and the species from the object is an essential determination of and contained within the more formal and defining species derived from the end); or the object is not naturally ordered to the end, and in this case the object is itself a separate means-end act structure -- in which also either the means is naturally ordered to the end or not. Here we are simply "range-finding" to parse out the different component acts of some general engagement.
The unit of currency of Thomas's analysis of moral action is the case in which the object is naturally ordered to the end. This is necessary even in order to understand composite act-structures composed of distinct acts for some general purpose, as with the example of adultery as ordered to theft. The per se is prior to the per accidens, and the proper and formal sense of the moral object as naturally ordered to its end is presupposed by composite acts. Thus in adultery ordered to theft the species from the end of adultery is less formal than that from the end of theft, because per accidens the first is for the second. But this composite analysis requires prior understanding of the per se structure of the moral act , prior understanding of an object naturally ordered to an end (what, otherwise, would be meant by an act of adultery, or an act of theft?). Thus the phrase that "Moral acts receive their species according to what is intended" ("Morales autem actus recipiunt speciem secundum id quod intenditur") is fully compatible with the use of St. Thomas's standard sense of "intention" as most formally regarding the end, and extending to the means in a secondary way.
It follows that there are two distinct and contrasting senses of that which is praeter intentionem. Firstly, since the species of the moral object is always contained within the species derived from its proper end it is never praeter intentionem in the sense of being outside the species of the end to which it is naturally ordered--which species is like a genus with respect to the species of the object. Hence in the passage of Thomas in question--"Moral acts receive their species according to what is intended, and not according to what is beside the intention" ("Morales autem actus recipiunt speciem secundum id quod intenditur, non autem ab eo quod est praeter intentionem, cum sit per accidens ...")--it is clear that the object cannot be held to be outside the species derived from the end. Secondly, in a different regard, the object is always praeter intentionem in the precisive sense that the object is not the end, and it is the object that is ordered to the end, and the species of the object is an essential determination contained under the species derived from the end and not the other way around. The object is not--is other than, is in this sense apart from or "precisively outside"-- the end. A sign of this is of course that one may intend the end prior to any choice of means.
Let us consider the article on defense with these distinctions in mind.
Where the object by its nature is ordered to the end, the more formal species is that derived from the end and of which the species of the object is a determination and under which it is contained. This is precisely what St. Thomas asserts in responding to what I think of as the "adolescent objection". The adolescent objection asks, why--if we can kill to save life,--can't we also licitly fornicate or commit adultery to save life? Thomas answers (Sth.II-II.64.7.ad4) that: "The act of fornication or adultery is not necessarily directed to the preservation of one's own life, as is the act whence sometimes results the taking of a man's life."(7)
In the quotation from Sth.II-II.64.7.ad4, homicide "sometimes" follows because it is accidental to the simple intention of defense as such that it require homicide: but it is not accidental to this defense that it be such as actually to require it. Similarly, it is accidental to travel that it be by car, but it is not accidental to a car trip that it is by car. Hence as Thomas teaches there is one most formal and containing species for such an act from which homicide at times follows, namely, the species of a defensive act. While the means chosen is deliberately lethal, what is intended in the slaying is defense, and the slaying is an essential determination of this act of defense. As St. Thomas puts it in Sth.I-II.12.4.ad3:
insofar as the movement of the will is to the end as acquired by the means, it is called "intention." A sign of this is that we can have intention of the end without having determined the means which are the object of choice.
This is simply to say that homicide may follow from intending the act of defense, but is accidental with respect to its simple intention. Formally speaking, the object is naturally ordered to the end, and is defined by the species of the end of which it is an essential determination. So there are two effects of the one act: one which is properly intended as the end of the defense (preservation of the life of an innocent), and one which is the deliberately chosen means of defense and which is accidental to the simple intention of preserving life, namely the lethal act of defense which stops the assailant. It is accidental to the moral species of a defensive act that the act should be lethal.
These considerations seem to remove the objection that Thomas cannot in Sth.II-II.64.7 mean by "intention" that which he normally means--i.e., the intention of the end. If the end, accordingly, is defensive--to protect the innocent--the presence of homicide where this is the only or best proportioned means of defense is not "intentional" because the homicide is wholly for the sake of defense and not for any other reason. The species of the end contains the species of the object--as Thomas says in his response to the "adolescent" fourth objection, the act of defense from which killing sometimes follows is naturally ordered to its end. This makes clearer a case like that of deliberately lethal self-defense, in which a lethal act is contained within a defensive species because it is naturally proportioned to the end of defense, and wherein a) the killing is not the object of simple intention while b)it is chosen and willed as the means and contained within the object of the moral act.
Thus read, St. Thomas teaches that a private citizen may never intend as an end--like the executioner--to kill. Yet, as indicated in Sth.II-II.64.7.resp. the private citizen may deliberately deploy a lethal means(8) when this is the only reasonable recourse in a just defense ("Nor is it necessary for salvation that a man omit the act of moderate self-defense in order to avoid killing the other man..."(9)). The proof that the killing is not embraced as an end, is that if the assailant stops the assault or surrenders, the defender does not then proceed to kill him. The cessation of the lethal act under these circumstances strongly contrasts with the act of the headsman, whose act follows moral judgment and does not merely ward off some present attack. The executioner prepares and acts toward the end of imposing a penalty of death, which hence is not only chosen but intended. His action is completed when the execution has been achieved.
This view of the contrast between private defense and public execution or other public slaying engages a different interpretation of "double-effect". For on this reading of intention, in private defense one effect is affiliated to the simple intention--that of protecting life--while the other effect is precisely willed as a means to that effect, and is praeter intentionem in the precisive sense because intention most properly regards the end, while in the nonprecisive sense it is not praeter intentionem (i.e., it is a lethal act contained within the species of defense).
Since Cajetan compares killing in defense by private parties with a bad consequence from good medicine, I will provide a contrasting medical illustration. A proper medical analogy might be the following: taking a medicine which will cause the vomiting up of a poison as the means to keep it from poisoning the patient. Here the bad effect of vomiting (from the vantage point of general health) is precisely what it is that causes the good effect of getting the poison out of one's system. Or consider the heart surgeon cutting open a victim on the operating table. He lays open a man's chest precisely as a "means" to the intended end of repairing the man's heart and hence promoting his life. Were he to choose to cut open the chest as an end--in Thomas's language, were he properly speaking to intend this--the act would not be justifiable. But as ordered to the end of health it is justifiable.(10) Why is this true? Because the species derived from the object is contained within the species derived from the end, and modifies it. As regards species, the act is not praeter intentionem--hence the laying open of the chest is a medical act rather than merely an act of carnage. But in the precisive sense it is praeter intentionem, because the laying open of the chest is not intended as the end. So what could never be intended as an end by a private citizen--rending open a person's chest--may be chosen or "intended" as a means, because it is in the genus of medical acts, its species is medical.(11)
It remains true that it is never permissible deliberately and directly to kill an innocent person. But the notion of innocence here is wider than that of moral innocence. For example, in craniatomy the child is not even possibly guilty of merely performing--even if in a morally non-responsible way--any aggressive conduct which could wrongfully endanger another. The reason why the tradition has always permitted killing in justified defense, is precisely because, even when the killed assailant is not morally responsible for his conduct, the assailant is still not performatively innocent, not innocent of performing aggressive and endangering acts which some are obligated to resist by proportionate means.
Unlike judicial penalty, there is no question of assessing moral responsibility of the assailant prior to mounting a defense, nor of calibrating one's resistance on the basis of the assailant's guilt. The use of lethal force in just self-defense is predicated not on the moral responsibility of the assailant, but on his lack of performative innocence. The datum that this person is, for whatever reason, unjustly endangering others, combined with the calling of someone to protect those endangered, yields the need for defense. The rationes of defense and of judicial penalty thus are irreducibly distinct. It should also be pointed out that the rationes of defense and medicine are irreducibly distinct.(12)
Homicide is permitted in justified defense only insofar as it is either the only or the best means to justified defense--in other words, when it is naturally proportioned to this end. In those cases in which a lethal act is chosen only because a lethal act as such is deemed sufficient to the defensive purpose of stopping the assailant, the object is specified as a defensive homicide (the specific difference of this defensive act being its lethality).
In conclusion, four points stand out: first, the per se connection of moral object and end in the normative case in which the object is naturally proportioned to the end; second, the need to include the physical character of what is done within the moral object under the ratio of its order to the end--to renounce moral angelism about the object; third, the analogical structure of intention in Thomas's teaching, in which intention is properly and chiefly of the end, while choice is of the means, which means are only secondarily spoken of as intended ;(13) and, fourthly, that the rationes of judicial punishment and of defense are fundamentally diverse, because judicial punishment follows a judgment of moral guilt, while defense follows a judgment of what is proportionate in resisting attack or the per se agent of destructive action.
Lest I fail in a basic responsibility of all speakers before this podium, I must add that three weeks ago I rebuked myself in the tribunal of my own conscience for being relatively original. But of course this position isn't original. First and primarily, it isn't original because I believe it is St. Thomas's actual position; but secondly, I discovered only two weeks ago, that in essentials this is also the interpretation held by the great Dominican commentator Francisco de Vitoria, of the Order of Preachers, the founder of international law, in his commentary on the secunda secundae.(14) Thus the wayward speculative mind and history once again meet.
1. Of course, in its ontological dimension the object is positive, but its natural limits may imply "minuses"--as running is something ontologically positive, but choosing to run rather than drive away from a lethally inclined pursuer may be imprudent because inclusive of the "minus" of deficient speed; or as crushing a skull is ontologically positive qua act, while inclusive of the defect that it materially comprises harm and--given the state of technology--death to the subject of such crushing.
2. In a passage that manifests the view both of intention, and regarding the matter of the act in defense, from Cajetan's Commentary on Sth.II-II.64.7.resp.: "Nam & finis, & medium ad finem cadunt sub intentione, ut patet in medico, qui intendit sanitatem per potionem, vel diaetam. Id autem, quod consequitur ex necessitate finis, non cadit sub intentione, sed praeter intentionem existens emergit, ut patet de debilitatione aegroti, quae sequitur ex medicina sanante. Et iuxta duos hos modos diversimode occidere potest licite persona publica, & privata: nam persona publica, ut miles, ordinat occisionem hostis, ut medium ad finem subordinatum bono communi, ut in litera dicitur, persona autem privata non intendit occidere, ut seipsum salvet, sed intendit salvare seipsum, non destitutus a sui defensione, etiam si alterius mortem ex sua defensione oporteat sequi. Et sic iste non occidit, nisi per accidens, ille autem per se occidit. Et propterea ad illud requiritur publica auctoritas, ad hoc non.-- --"For the end and the means to the end fall under intention, as is clear with a doctor who intends health through a draught or diet. But that which as consequence follows from the necessity of the end does not fall under intention, but arises existing outside the intention, as is clear from the weakening of the body that follows from healing medicine. Likewise in two different ways it may be licit to kill, that of the public person and the private: for the public person, as for instance a solidier, orders the death of the enemy as a means to the end subordinated to the common good as is said in the text, but the private person does not intend to kill that he may be saved, but intends to save himself not depriving himself in defense--even though the death of the other should necessarily follow from this defense. And so in this way the latter (the private person) kills per accidens, while the former (the public officer) kills per se."
3. See Martin Rhonheimer'sNatural Law and Practical Reason (New York: Fordham, 2000), note 20, p. 487
4. Sth.II-II.64.7.resp.: "...nihil prohibet unius actus esse duos effectus, quorum alter solum sit in intentione, alius vero sit praeter intentionem. Morales autem actus recipiunt speciem secundum id quod intenditur, non autem ab eo quod est praeter intentionem, cum sit per accidens ..."
5. Sth.I-II.18.7.resp.: "Si vero obiectum per se ordinetur ad finem, una dictarum differentiarum est per se determinativa alterius. Unde una istarum specierum continebitur sub altera."
6. Sth.I-II.18.7.resp.: "Et ex istis sequitur quod differentia specifica quae est ex fine, est magis generalis; et differentia quae est ex obiecto per se ad talem finem ordinato, est specifica respectu eius."
7. Sth.II-II.64.7.ad4: "Dicendum quod actus fornicationis vel adulterii non ordinatur ad conservationem propriae vitae ex necessitate, sicut actus ex quo quandoque sequitur homicidium."
8. Sth.II-II.64.7.resp.: "Nec est necessarium ad salutem ut hunc actum moderatae tutelae praetermittat ad evitandam occisionem alterius..."
9. Finnis, p. 278.
10. The point here is not that the other version of double-effect is not useful, but that its usefulness pertains to distinguishing consequences from the object of the act, while for the case of deliberate choice of lethal means in defense (and for certain other cases) this version is unavailing.
11. One can imagine an interlocutor asking: how can ripping open someone's chest in bloody fashion be medicinal? And the answer needs to show the natural proportion of this act to the medicinal end, i.e. that this is an act required by and ordered to those medicinal acts in heart surgery which cure rather than harm. Similarly, the act of lethal defense is one whose natural proportion to the end of defense must be shown, i.e., that it is an act required by and ordered to the protection of innocents. Even then, it also must be shown not to threaten undue harm to other innocents, nor to use force or inflict damage exceeding what is required for an effective and sure defense. Recently it has been brought to my attention by Prof. John Boyle of the University of St. Thomas in St. Paul, Minnesota (not to be confused with Prof. Boyle of Toronto whose position on the nature of the moral object is shared with Grisez and Finnis) that this position is identical with that of Vitoria, whose illustration is also medical in character. Cf. note #14.
12. Not only is it true that a fetus cannot properly be characerized as a per se cause of destructive or harmful conduct which one is obligated to resist, but medicine is not the art of defense. If one's general practioner enters the waiting room carrying a corpse and saying "I had to destroy the village in order to save it" one had best seek a new physician.
13. For St. Thomas that which primarily is spoken of as being "intended" is the end, whereas the object of one's external act (which is as means to the end) is primarily spoken of by St. Thomas qua means as "chosen". Hence the following words of St. Thomas: "Accordingly, in so far as the movement of the will is to the means, as ordained to the end, it is called "choice"; but insofar as the movement of the will is to the end as acquired by the means, it is called "intention." A sign of this is that we can have intention of the end without having determined the means which are the object of choice." On this point see Sth.I-II.12.4.ad3; see also Sth I-II.12.1.resp.;Sth I-II, 12.3.resp.
Just as "object" is an analogous term, so are "end" and "intention" as deployed by St. Thomas in his account of the moral act. But in the focal and most proper sense, as St. Thomas puts it (I-II.13.4.resp.) "Just as intention regards the end, so does choice regard the means"; or (Sth.I-II.12.1.ad4): "Intention is an act of the will in regard to the end." The notion of intention only can extend to means at all because and insofar as they are ordered to an end. Because one deliberates regarding means, one does indeed in an analogous sense intend them--they are rationally chosen and hence ought be morally choiceworthy. But this is a secondary and derivative sense of intention by comparison with the primary sense, which regards the end of the external act which is the raison d'etre of the whole. If then Thomas is speaking of intention as of the end the only way to avoid the logic of the passage (Sth.II.-II.64.7.resp.: "Illicitum est quod homo intendat occidere hominem ut seipsum defendat") is to treat intention as properly and most formally pertaining to the means. But far from intention being chiefly of the means, it is chiefly of the end, and where the object is by its nature ordered to the end, the most formal and defining species is derived from the end, under which species the object is contained and of which it is an essential determination.
14. He writes, speaking of killing in defense, "Si enim qui se defendit non habeat alia arma sino un arcabuz, tunc clarum est quod non potest se defendere non habeat alia arma sino un arcabuz, tunc clarum est quod non potest se defendere nisi occidendo. Ergo etiam licet velle occidere. Et quando ultra arguitur: ergo licet intendere: nego consequentiam, quia differentia est inter electionem et intentionem, quia intentio est ejus quod per se intentum est us finis. Sic ergo non licet propter se intendere mortem alterius, sed solum facere totum quod probabiliter potest ad defensionem suam. Sic etiam infirmus propter salutem vult abscindere brachium, sed non hoc intendit, cum non vellit de per se quod abscindatur brachium. Et breviter, ne in hoc maneat scrupulus, dicimus quod totum quod est necessarium ad defensionem, totum illud licet velle, sed non intendere.