Contemporary Philosophy Facing
"Fides et Ratio"

• 1) Introduction
  Although the Encyclical Letter " Fides et ratio" is primarily addressed to bishops and theologians (stressing that the study of philosophy is very important for those who study theology), I would like to try to show that the connection between faith and reason is an important problem for everybody (believers and non believers in the Christian faith). To do this implies that I shall have to address the many streams which flow into the main river of contemporary philosophy, and whose diversity has influenced the Encyclical Letter itself. There are in fact affinities and contrasts between the subjects of contemporary philosophy (continental and angloamerican) and the main contents of the Encyclical Letter. I would like to consider some of these main subjects, attempt to highlight common points and discuss difficulties.

• 2) Faith and reason are intertwined
  I hold that there is no rationality without evidence (in a narrow or strong sense) and also there is no rationality "in practice" without trust in our reason as well as in that of others. Faith and reason are deeply intertwined in every man. On the one hand reason in a narrow sense means assent to evidence and well grounded truths. For instance: truths of mathematics and particularly main principles of logic and metaphysics (i.e. the principle of contradiction). On the first principles are grounded science in the classical sense, the classical proofs of God's existence and even hermeneutics [1]. Every reasonable belief is grounded on the basis of some evidence: "Although time changes and knowledge increases, it is possible to discern a core of philosophical insight within the history of thought as a whole. Consider, for example, the principles of non-contradiction, finality and causality, as well as the concept of the person as a free and intelligent subject, with the capacity to know God, truth and goodness. Consider as well certain fundamental moral norms which are shared by all" [2]. Without evidence as its frame, faith is impossible (also Christian faith), lacking firm contents. We understand why natural theology (even implicit) is so important if we want to stress the rationality of the Christian faith [3]. This point is not easily accepted by contemporary philosophy, not even by Catholic contemporary philosophy and theology [4].

  But reason is not only speculative reason. On the other hand faith is assent to something not because its content is evident, but because we believe in someone. Testimony is the source of belief. It is noteworthy that without Christianity and its concept of faith in a strong sense there would not have been a Western philosophical approach to faith and belief (as Augustine shows) [5].

  Sometimes it is difficult to distinguish between evidence and faith. In fact there are faiths which seem to carry upon themselves a great deal of evidence. As an example of this, let us consider our relationships with other people. We find here a deep connection between faith and evidence: on the one hand we believe in the feelings of others, although there is no evidence of them in a strict sense; on the other hand it is evident that human beings are more perfect than any other being in the world and the most worthy of respect.

  Faith and reason never have the same content nor do they have the same content under the same viewpoint. Without faith in others, reason would not be fed and therefore would not work (as contemporary psychology shows), without reason (in the strong sense) and its evidence, faith could not be firm or reasonable and could not be explicitated in our reflection. Moreover without reason there would not be faith in the capabilities of our reason. In fact we believe more and more in reason, because reason works. Therefore faith, hope and charity (in a wide sense) are the main charachteristics of reason itself [6]. Faith and reason are not unrelated. There is a "faithful reason" as well as a "reasonable faith", although there are faiths which are more or less reasonable. An example of the deep connection between faith and reason is this: we may believe a fact because we believe in those who tell us that fact, but also because we are aware of some evident truths connected with that fact. Therefore faith and reason are the two lungs of human rationality [7]. As the Encyclical Letter "Fides et ratio" holds: "In believing, we entrust ourselves to the knowledge acquired by other people. This suggests an important tension. On the one hand, the knowledge acquired through belief can seem an imperfect form of knowledge, to be perfected gradually through personal acumulation of evidence; on the other hand, belief is often humanly richer than mere evidence, because it involves an interpersonal relationship and brings into play not only a person's capacity to know but also the deeper capacity to entrust oneself to others, to enter into a relationship with them which is intimate and enduring" [8]. It is noteworthy that a great deal of contemporary philosophy (particularly of continental philosophy) might quite easily accept this truth, after the crisis of modern rationalism [9].

  I hold that realism, the openness of man to reality (considered in itself as well as through other people) is the common ground of a "faithful reason" and of a "reasonable faith". There is a consent to being itself which is the very ground of every human question and inquiry.

• 3) Worldviews
  Worldviews are grounded on evidence as well as on faiths. They have many foundations [10]. In our worldview evidence and faiths are intertwined and they make strong for each other: also Marxism and Liberalism might be called "faiths" in a broad sense. We do not assent reasonably to concepts of life when everything is clear, but when we think that there are enough reasons for us in order to assent. The virtue of phronesis judges here and now if a worldview is reasonable for us.

  Every faith (worldview) is grounded on some reason, but non every faith is equally reasonable, because not every faith (worldview) answers the demands of men and confirms their evidence. The value of a faith depends on will, reasons and the facts that we encounter (from a theological point of view we can speak also of Grace). These are the very grounds of Christian faith according to Catholic theology. Therefore we never can judge a man upon his assent or upon his lack of assent, but we can judge (and in fact we often judge) the contents of his faith. That faith (or worldview) is reasonable which considers deeply and integrally man, his desires and demands (for happiness, justice, truth, eternity, beauty) and the evidences of reality (particularly the logical-ontological first principles and those ontological truths such as the whole of being and the "human person" qua the highest being in the hierarchy of beings as it is intentionally open to the whole of being) [11].

  It is noteworthy that the Encyclical Letter has a Thomistic frame, but within it we may also find personalistic accents of contemporary continental philosophy grounded on this frame Against Kant and contemporary kantianism we must stress that, since reason is one, in our experience there is not a wide gap between theoretical reason and practical reason (our aims). That means that human desires are always grounded on ontological evidence; as Augustine stresses, we cannot look for happiness without seeking also truth and eternity [12]. Man does not only seek happiness, but reality as well and he cannot search for them without previously somehow knowing what they are [13]. He needs a true concept of himself and of his happiness. He does not want to be deceived.

  As there are good faiths (in a broad sense), there are also negative faiths, in which proof is used in order to develop a narrowness of mind or a form of resentement in front of reality [14]. This often happens in postchristian culture. Two instances of a bad faith are: faith in ideologies or an exaggerated faith in science and technology. For instance: it is worthwhile to note that more than one century ago the Encyclical Letter "Rerum novarum" (1893) had foreseen the drama of twentieth century totalitarianism [15] and also that after fifty years of research the hope that computers could imitate the human mind is perhaps not so strong as it was some years ago. It is reasonable for everybody to acknowledge that in our world there are not only problems (which can be resolved by us), but also mysteries (what is in itself reasonable, but non reasonable for us). To sum up: a worldview or a concept of life is more reasonable if it fulfils the demands of men and particularly their basic demands. This is an important criterion in order to evaluate a culture [16].

  Otherwise, because of the unity of man and his reason, it is reasonable that whoever wishes to bring his/her main demands to mature developement and searches and reaches adequate responses to them, can find out more than others do, not only that evidence which is peculiar to his worldview, but also that which is "de iure" for everybody. Therefore his human nature is exalted. In this case we might speak about an assent to our everyday consent to reality.

• 4) Philosophy and religious experience
  If what I have just said is true, it is also reasonable to say that the assent of faith to a "Mysterious Truth" can develop also the rational capability of understanding every man's truth. If the demand for fulfiment and the religious experience are the peak of our human experience [17], reason needs religious experience and religious faith in order not to become an instrumental, formal and ultimately nihilistic reason. In the history of Western societies this faith is the Christian faith.

  The problem of the connection between philosophy and religious experience is particularly important nowadays. In fact we are facing a deep change of demarkations between the different disciplines and, within philosophy itself, among the different philosophical disciplines. On the one hand there is a wide gap between religious experience and philosophy (e.g. logical positivism and some streams of analytical philosophy), on the other hand a confusion of subjects and methods (a kind of gnosticism, particularly in continental philosophy). When the demarkation between religion and philosophy is not clear, it may happen that philosophy uses the kind of language of testimony and of invocation which is typical of religion.

  It seems that, when reason loses its fruitful connection with faith and religious experience, it fluctuates between a loss of belief in its capabilities and an exaggerated belief in those capabilities (which causes reactions of mistrust). In fact it is philosophically reasonable that what can actually unify man and give meaning to his life and to the operations of his mind is necessarily transcendent and cannot be grasped by man through the efforts of his own reason (considered as a search for evidence), but only by a faith (which is not unreasonable and which can concern the whole man).

• 5) Faith seeking Understanding
  If a belief is conceived as certain and reasonable, even implicitly, by those who have it, if it is not only a postulate, a demand, a feeling in order to defeat fear, it attempts to justify itself when facing other concepts of life. That happens when a faith is discussed by different worldviews. In fact that is the case of the genesis and the developement of Christian theology and philosophy during the first centuries. Nonetheless it is true that philosophical reason needs the certainties of experience and particularly of religious experience in order to believe in itself, to develop its contents and even in order to become free from religion itself (as has often happened during the modern period).

• 6) What kind of Faith is the Christian Faith?
  But we are not concerned with just any kind of faith. Particularly: what kind of faith is the Christian faith? It is faith in a strong sense. Christianity seems to be not first of all a theory, a philosophy, but a unique Event, in which there implicitly lies a concept of the world which may become explicit. To believe in Christianity can be looked upon as fascinating by a wise man we meet. If our idea of reality is not an essentialistic one, if there is in reality a primacy of events, if, in thomistic terms, we acknowledge the primacy of the act of existing, the Christian faith is concerned with a Mystery, and that is not absurd. It is not a priori strange for a single event to bear universality. In this way we can begin answering Lessing's famous problem, which is still up to date in contemporary culture and philosophy [18]. I believe that this is one of the main difficulties in facing the Encyclical Letter.

  To sum up: it is reasonable to assent to truths which are meaningful for the fulfilment of man's main demands. From this point of view the Christian faith ( fides qua ) is not an emotional, extrarational attitude. Faith is converted reason, reason which believes, which finds out arguments to believe. Without the ontological dimension of our reason, faith cannot concern the totality of being. I believe we have to study in depth the problem of the connection between the ontological and the symbolical dimension of the Christian faith.

• 7) Uniqueness of cultures and the analogous concept of culture
  This concept of Christianity has consequences. Although there are universal laws of reality as well as of our thought (the dimension of order , of essence), reality is compounded by unique events (the dimension of existence, act of existing )[19]. This is in my opinion the metaphysical background of Fides et ratio. We find this idea of uniqueness in contemporary Jewish thought (for instance in Lévinas). Christianity helps us in thinking of the uniqueness of events: just as the event of Christ is unique, so , in an analogous way, is the Patristics' thought very important in the tradition of the Church, so do Aquinas' theology and philosophy have a peculiar meaning and so on [22]. We can also hold that the function of men in society might not be the same as that of women, although they all have the same dignity. That means that the task of reason is not to level everything (that is the illuministic idea of reason). From this point of view every culture has equal dignity, but non the same value. Why should they? The concept of culture is analogous [23].

  As I have stressed, the criterium in order to evaluate cultures is their capability of facing the integrity of the demands of man and the integrity of reality in general. Both aspects are important. Many cultures in fact agree with reality, but by reducing man's demands, or by stressing his demands without facing reality. This kind of approach often becomes a "habitus", sometimes a bad habitus (a vice). Therefore non every culture is equally important for man and for Christianity, although every culture bears some peculiar values. It is important to stress this point in our age of multiculturalism.

• 8) Eclecticism
  Nowadays we have passed from an exaggerated belief in reason, possible on the ground of Christian experience and not only on Greek philosophy (Hegelism, and the great optimistic ideologies of the last two centuries, such as marxism) to a crisis of reason, a disbelief in its capabilities of knowing reality ( nihilism). Therefore the Church itself, which in the modern period strongly fought against optimistic-antropocentric reason, now defends reason, its possibility to identify a common ground for every man and for every culture. I believe that nowadays we must stress this point. In particular: "Fides et ratio" is against Eclecticism in philosophy and theology. According to the Encyclical Letter Eclecticism means "the approach of those who, in research, teaching and argumentation, even in theology, tend to use individual ideas drawn from different philosophies, without concern for their internal coherence, their place within a system or their historical context" [24]. If reason does not fear reality, but loves it (assents to it) if it is faithful, if it knows that it is developing itself by facing reality, it looks for theoretical coherence. On the contrary, Eclecticism with its lack of coherence may be the effect of fear in the face of reality and, therefore, of the exaggerated desire of being appreciated by contemporary culture ( historicism). But, as Aquinas stresses, feeble arguments in defense of the Christian faith are not helpful for those who do not believe [25].

• 9) The roots of skepticism and nihilism in contemporary philosophy
  Nowadays very often some philosophers (both continental and non) happen to negate some truths, which are also the very grounds of natural theology and of Christian faith, although they contradict themselves (and perhaps sometimes it is apparent paradoxically that they know they are doing so) [26]. But I hold that the main reason of this statement is not a logical or an epistemic one, but an ontologic-anthropological and an ethical one. Firstly by anthropological I mean that the tendency to a "non stop" process towards infinity in the foundation of our arguments is due to the fact that we do not acknowledge the peculiarity of the transcendental or "classic" philosophical argument [27], flattening this kind of argument on the level of the apodictic argument which in fact is always a "non stop" one, as Aristotle argued [28]. This mistrust of the capabilities of philosophical reason seems to be grounded on an injustified presupposition: human reason could not know being itself, but only the phenomenon. This presupposition is connected with the negation of the role of intentionality and of formal causality in our knowledge [29]. But that belief ( phenomenism), as many philosophers (first of all Hegel) showed, is a presupposition which involves contradiction [30]. Therefore that kind of skepticism is not epistemically grounded. It might be only anthropologically and ethically grounded.

  Secondly, let us look at the ethical reasons of that kind of skepticism. Modern immanentism wrongly substituted the level of speculative reason for the level of practical reason, practical opposition, our desire which is not fulfilled (which is a real opposition) with theoretical contradiction (which is only intentional), as happens in Hegel and Marx. But when transcendence (God) is not admitted for metaphysics, human desire becomes radically not fulfilled [31]. That means that for those philosophers reality is in itself contradictory. We can find this difficulty also within the philosophical streams which reacted against modern rationalistic thought (i.e. Nietzsche and "postmodern thought"), because they are also often closed towards transcendence. The concept of "bad infinity" (a "non stop" infinity) easily becomes a surrogate for the Real infinity (infinity in act), of which nowadays we seldom make experience, about which we are not used to reflect and which we may consider a cause of violence and of alienation [32] In a postchristian culture the philosophy of sophists and of Eraclitus, against which Aristotle strongly opposed, might acquire the character of a fight for liberation, which at one time they had not have. The search for originality and authenticity at all costs lead us to negate those theoretical and practical main principles which in fact are invariably accepted by all [33]. Therefore I believe that there are ontological, anthropological (that means a certain idea of man and knowledge) and ethical reasons for our difficulty to acknowledge in our philosophical reflection those basic first principles (first evidence) on which everyday knowledge and science as well as ethics are grounded. In fact we must consider also that in postmodernity the idea of an infinite God seems to set a limit to the human freedom of interpreting the world and one's life (infinity of hermeneutics) and of choosing as one likes a certain way of life (ethical relativism) [34].

• 10) Conclusion
  The main problem for philosophical reason is to freely assent to those truths to which we always consent (as Aristotle first of all showed) [35]. As T. S. Eliot wrote: "...human kind cannot bear very much reality" [36]. Without this assent to reality religious sense would not be developed [37]. But nowadays we cannot go back to Greek Philosophy, leaving aside that event that is Christianity. Paradoxically it seems true that in the history of Western culture and philosophy the assent to Christ as both God and man can help men in facing reality (man and world) and in giving assent to it, fighting against fear in the face of reality [38]. Moreover this seems to be true particularly in the age of technology and massmedia (television, computer, internet, wargames) in which our feeling of reality becomes more and more feeble. Therefore inside Western culture, Christianity with its idea of an Infinity in this world determines always a prephilosophical and therefore also a philosophical problem. From this point of view philosophy (reflection on our experience) and particularly that philosophy which is Thomism (strictly connected with every day experience) cannot be used primarily as a weapon against contemporary thought in order to overcome fear, but as a useful way to clarify a meaningful experience which already does not fear reality. Both the depth of the best continental philosophy and the strong argumentation of analytical philosophy are useful in this job of facing reality [39].

  In our time, as always, is very important that believers should help each other in seeking understanding of their faith. Dialogue among friends is more useful than dialectics against enemies as Plato stressed many centuries ago [40]. Also the Encyclical Letter agrees with this point [41].

  To sum up: everybody, believer or non believer, deals with both faith and reason. But the problem is: which faith is here and now more reasonable and human? Everybody is responsible in front of truth. Nowadays the fear of intolerance and violence, widespread in our culture, cannot overshadow our deep commitment to truth. If the search for truth is natural among human beings (and it is so) to hinder it might sooner or later become a cause of violence.

  Angelo Campodonico, Department of Philosophy

  University of Genoa

  ---

  Notes

  [1] Cfr. A. Campodonico, Experience of Reality, Integrity and God, Proceedings of the Summer Thomistic Institute 1997(in press ): "When our knowledge concerns accidental and individual things (and that is the case of human actions and endeavours), hermeneutics is a substitute for science. If we want to grasp the true meaning of something, we have to gather many aspects of that subject, considering them as a whole and possibly from the point of view of the whole. For instance: Aquinas suggests in his ethics that I must look at the aim of my action, at its matter and its circumstances, if I want to know what I must do now: "... malum contingit ex singularibus defectibus, bonum vero ex tota et integra causa"( Summa theologiae I-II, 19, 6). What I am saying is that in this and similar cases we must ask: Is something missing? Is this the only point of view on that subject? Can I look at this problem from a wider point of view? This is actually the method of hermeneutics, that in ethics needs also moral integrity of man (practical truth)".

  To sum up, science and hermeneutics share a common criterion: they are always based on a perfection or integrity pattern. From this point of view the classical Aristotelian science pattern is the basis of empirical science pattern and of hermeneutics' pattern too. But that pattern is not necessarily a priori: it develops, as I hold, through experience of reality and its order".

  [2] Fides et ratio 4.

  [3] Cfr A. Kenny, What is Faith?. Essays in the Philosophy of Religion , Oxford University Press, Oxford 1992, pp. 33-43.

  [4] Cfr. Fides et ratio 84.

  [5] Cfr. St. Augustine, De fide rerum quae non videntur.

  [6] On faith in a wide sense see ee Polanyi, Personal Knowledge. Towards a Post-critical Philosophy, Routledge and Kegan Paul , London 1959 and H. Gadamer, Truth and Interpretation ; on the "principle of charity" see D. Davidson, On the Very Idea of a Conceptual Scheme . In "Proceedings of the American Philosophical Association", 47, p. 5-20; on the "Principle of hope" see E. Bloch, Das Prinzip Hoffnung , Suhrkamp, Frankfurt a M. 1959

  [7] Cfr . Fides et ratio , the Introduction.

  [8] Fides et ratio 32.

  [9] Cfr. Polanyi, Personal Knowledge... Cfr. C.A.J. Coady, Testimony. A Philosophical Study , Clarendon Press, Oxford 1992.

  [10] See W. Alston, Perceiving God. The Epistemology of Religious Experience, Cornell University Press, Ithaca and London 1991, p. 306.

  [11] Cfr. Fides et ratio 83: "In this sense , metaphysics should not be seen as an alternative to anthropology, since it is metaphysics which makes it possible to ground the concept of personal dignity in virtue of their spiritual nature. In a special way, the person constitutes a priviledged locus for the encounter with being, and hence with metaphysical enquiry"

  [12] Cfr. Saint Augustine, Confessiones X, 20, 29; De trinitate XIII, 7, 10; De civitate Dei XIV, 25.

  [13] Cfr. R. Spaemann, Glück un Wohlwollen. Versuch über Ethik , Klett-Cotta, Stuttgart 1990.

  [14] Cfr. H. Arendt , The Burden of our Time , Secker and Warburg, London 1951, pp. 438-39.

  [15] Cfr. Encyclical Letter "Rerum Novarum" I, 14.

  [16] See F. von Kutschera, Vernunft und Glaube, Walter de Gruyter, Berlin-New York 1991, particularly p. 241-251.

  [17] Cfr. A. Campodonico, Experience of Reality... : "We can distinguish among some important branches of human experience: an ontological experience (experience of being, of reality) that culminates in a metaphysical experience of Absolute, a moral experience ( experience of the aim of our life and of the search for that aim) that culminates in a religious experience (experience of salvation, or of demand for salvation) and also an aesthetic experience of beauty and art. As we can easily realize, these different kinds of experience, along with speculative and practical reason, are intertwined. In my opinion our experience is something organic with on top religious experience (in its wide sense). In fact, in religious experience there is a close tie between the top of the practical use of reason (demand for salvation) and the top of the speculative use of reason (knowledge of the existence of Absolute, of God). If we do not develop experience till the religious level (and this is an ethical problem), the other kinds of experience will become contracted and our reflection on experience will not work properly".

  [18] Cfr. H.E. Allison, Lessing and the Enlightenment , p. 119: "But if the written tradition of the Christian religion neither can, nor ought to give it inner truth; then it is not from it that the Christian religion has its inner truth. But if it does not derive its truth from this tradition, then it does not depend upon it. But if it does not depend upon it; then it can persist without it. That is all I want". Cfr. also K. Jaspers , Der philosophische Glaube angesichts der Offenbarung , 1962.

  [19] Cfr. A. Campodonico, Experience of Reality ... Initially there is a transcendental ground of ontological experience

  [20] . Here we can find, in the first place, a dimension of actuality, of event that does not depend on ourselves and that Thomistic philosophy calls "act of existing": for something to exist or not exist is not the same. As the "act of existing" actuates everything, it means also integrity (perfection), because it is the very cause of every perfection we can find in reality

  [21] . On the transcendental ground of human experience the main dimension is the act of existing which is the cause of the existence of everything. To perceive being as being makes the whole of being accessible, and that means the Absolute (whole as whole is absolute, because it does not depend on anything).

  In the second place reality shows a certain order, a certain harmony that we can call perfection or integrity too. This is the classical level of essence ( essentia). This order shows itself phenomenologically as an order of reality and not as an order we ourselves create in reality.

  [22] Cfr Fides et ratio "72: "...in engaging great cultures for the first time, the Church cannot abandon what she has gained for her inculturation in the world of Greco-latin thought. To reject this heritage would be to deny the providential plan of God who guides his Church down the paths of time and history. This criterion is valid for the Church in every age, even for the Church of the future, who will judge herself enriched by all that comes from today's engagement with Eastern cultures and will find in this inheritance fresh cues for fruitful dialogue with the cultures which will emerge as humanity moves into the future"

  [23] Cfr. Fides et ratio 72 passim: "...the first of these (criteria) is the universality of the human spirit, whose basic needs are the same in the most disparate cultures ...care will need to be taken lest, contrary to the very nature of the human spirit, the legitimate defense of the uniqueness and originality of Indian thought be confused with the idea that a particular cultural tradition should remain closed in its difference and affirm itself by opposing other traditions". Cfr. A. Roest Crollius, Inculturation and the Meaning of Culture , "Gregorianum" 61, 1980, pp. 253-74.

  [24] Fides et ratio 86.

  [25] Cfr. Thomas Aquinas Quaestiones disputatae de potentia Dei IV, 2.

  [26] Cfr. Fides et ratio 91: "...the currents of thought which claim to be postmodern merit appropriate attention. According to some of them, the time of certainties is irrevocably past, and the human being must now learn to live in a horizon of total absence of meaning, where everything is provisional and ephemeral".

  [27] Cfr. Aristotle, Metaphysics IV.

  [28] Cfr. Aristotle, Post. Anaytics . Cfr. P. Pagani, Il tema della "fondazione ultima" in alcuni aspetti del dibattito contemporaneo , Franco Angeli, Milano 1999.

  [29] Cfr. J. Haldane, A Return to Form in the Philosophy of Mind , "Ratio" XI, 1998, p. 269 passim: "It is very important...to make clear that formal causation is not a kind of efficient causation, or a rival to it...Efficient causation is the vehicle for the communication of form; form is what structures the object, the thought and the movement between them"."

  [30] Cfr. G.W. Hegel, Encyclopaedia, Introduction, § 10.

  [31] See C. Vigna, Contraddizione pratica, desiderio, coerenza in L'etica e il suo altro , a c. di C. Vigna, Franco Angeli, Milano 1994.

  [32] Cfr. Fides et ratio 46 "As a result of the crisis of rationalism, what has appeared finally is nihilism. As a philosophy of nothingness, it has a certain attraction for people of our time. Its adherents claim that the search is an end in itself, without any hope or possibility of ever attainig the the goal of truth".

  [33] Cfr. C. Taylor, The Malaise of Modernity , Canadian Broadcasting Corporation 1991.

  [34] Cfr. F. Nietzsche, The gay science , fr. 110, 111, 115.

  [35] Cfr. Aristotle, Metaphysics IV.

  [36] T.S. Eliot, Four Quartets , I, 44-45 .

  [37] Cfr. L. Giussani , The Religious Sense , translated by J. Zucchi, Mc Gill, Queen's Universirty Press, Montreal & Kingston, London, Buffalo 1997.

  [38] . Fides et ratio 56: "...it is necessary not to abandon the passion for ultimate truth, the eagerness to search for it or the audacity to forge new paths in the search. It is a faith which stirs reason to move beyond all isolation and willingly to run risks so that it may attain whatever is beautiful, good and true. Faith thus become the convinced and convincing advocate of reason".

  [39] Cfr. Thomism and the Future of Catholic Philosophy in "New Blackfriars", vol. 80n. 968, April 1999; Analytical Thomism , edited by J. Haldane "The Monist", vol. 80, N s 4, 1997; R. Pouivet, Après Wittgenstein , Saint Thomas , PUF, Paris 1997.

  [40] Cfr. Plato, Letter VII.

  [41] Cfr. Fides et ratio 33: "It must not be forgotten that reason too needs to be sustained in all its searching by trusting dialogue and sincere friendship. A climate of suspicion and distrust, which can beset speculative research, ignores the teaching of the ancient philosophers who proposed friendship as one of the most appropriate contexts for sound philosophical enquiry".