

TIME AND THE HUMAN PERSON

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Jacques Maritain's references to temporality usually concern the distinction between the temporal and the spiritual. In *Integral Humanism*, he says that the temporal and the spiritual must be distinguished as two different "planes of activity." Spiritual activity is essentially directed toward eternal life. Examples of spiritual activity include "liturgical and sacramental life... the work of the virtues or of contemplation... the apostolate or... the works of mercy."¹ Temporal activity, on the other hand, aims at "goods which are not eternal life, but which concern in a general way the things of time, the work of civilization or of culture."² Temporal activity may be intellectual, moral, scientific, artistic, social, political, etc., but essentially concerns things of the world. Maritain thus bases the distinction between the spiritual and the temporal on the distinction between eternity and time. In this context, "eternal" does not mean "everlasting for all time;" rather, it means "non-temporal" or "outside of time."³ The ultimate end of spiritual activity is eternal life, and the end of temporal activity is a good that changes and is subject to time. However, it is important to note that as human activities, both spiritual and temporal activity take place in time despite their different ends.⁴ This suggests an intersection between time and eternity. And Maritain does acknowledge a third plane of activity, "the plane of the spiritual in its

¹ Jacques Maritain, *Integral Humanism: Temporal and Spiritual Problems of a New Christendom* (1936), trans. Joseph W. Evans (Notre Dame, Indiana: University of Notre Dame Press, 1973), p. 291.

² *Ibid.*, p. 292.

³ It is easy to conflate the two meanings of "eternal," because both the non-temporal and the everlasting are "permanent." Nevertheless, the distinction is important for questions such as the eternity of God, the possible eternity of the universe, and the nature of time.

⁴ Some may propose that contemplation is an experience in which time is suspended. However, I would describe contemplation as a relational experience of eternity, in a distinctive form of lived time.

connection with the temporal.”⁵ Although “the spiritual order is... superior to the temporal order,” there is also a “vital union” between the spiritual and the temporal. Activity in this plane of intersection agrees with spiritual activity in having eternal life for its object, but focuses on temporal goods precisely in order to subordinate them to spiritual goods. According to Maritain, such activity includes the “Christian effort of socio-temporal renewal,”⁶ which works toward “a relative though real earthly happiness”⁷ and the personal growth and relative fulfillment of human beings. This third plane of activity draws attention to the intersection between eternity and time and makes it possible for us to show the relationship between spiritual and temporal activity as well as to explain the difference between them. Because the spiritual and the temporal are two planes of activity of the human person, the nature of the human person provides the link between them.

In this paper, I will follow Maritain in using the term “temporal” to distinguish temporal activity from spiritual activity according to their ends. In order to focus on temporal and spiritual activities as activities, I will distinguish among several different aspects of time: the lived time of human experience, the sacred time of spiritual activity, and the clock time of industrial and post-industrial civilization.⁸ Using Maritain’s distinction between the person and the material individual, I will demonstrate how the difference between clock time and lived time is related to the difference between the material individual as a part and the human person as a whole, and show how the modern material individual follows the time of the clock. After describing the origins, advantages, and disadvantages of clock time, I will argue that a focus on clock time displaces the lived time of actual human experience and reduces the person to the material individual. I will then show how a

⁵ Jacques Maritain, *op. cit.*, p. 296.

⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 254.

⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 137.

⁸ Consequently, the adjective “temporal” is reserved for activity directed toward the world as world and cannot be used in this paper for time in general or sacred time in particular.

focus on lived time restores the person as end and as directed toward eternal life, and thereby also restores the sacred time of spiritual activity.

It is possible to distinguish variations with respect to how time is experienced and understood. Maritain was aware of differences in people's understanding of time. For example, in *Integral Humanism*, he observes that the dualism characteristic of modernity created a split between living a "religious" human life and living a "natural" human life:

For too long during this modern age the Christian world wounded by dualism has obeyed two opposite rhythms, a religious rhythm for the time of the Church and of worship, a naturalist rhythm for the time of the world and of profane life.⁹

He thus points to the difficulty of maintaining an intersection between the spiritual and the temporal, when the temporal is defined by the secular, where holy days yield to the work week and liturgies give way to football games. The very idea of confining religious experience or spiritual activity to an hour or two a week speaks to the primacy of a naturalist and secular view of time. Another variation within the temporal occurs with respect to the use of time for work or for leisure. In *Reflections on America*, Maritain comments on "the American attitude toward time" which includes "a certain horror of any span of time which a man might have at his own disposal in order to *do nothing*."¹⁰ He says:

The great value and efficacy of standing idle, and lingering over one's dream, is little appreciated in this country... [F]riendship requires a great waste of time, and much idleness; creative thinking requires a great deal of idleness. So it is that leisure constitutes a serious problem for American life...The question will be to have leisure time occupied in a manner really profitable to man, and not entirely taken up by the kind of

⁹ Jacques Maritain, *op. cit.*, p. 78.

¹⁰ Jacques Maritain, *Reflections on America* (New York: Gordian Press, 1975), p. 156.

stupefying passivity that is more often than not developed by movies or television.¹¹

Maritain thus suggests a use of time which is different from both frenetic activity and stupefying passivity and which allows the development of friendship, creativity, and other distinctively human pursuits. Similarly, in *Leisure, The Basis of Culture*, Josef Pieper points out the vast differences among the busy activity of the work-a-day world, the passivity of simple idleness, and the condition of leisure, which he describes as receptive understanding, effortless relaxation, celebration and the affirmation of reality as a whole.¹² Leisure understood this way is a "time out" from the time of schedules, not just a "break" from work but "the power to step beyond the working world"¹³ and to experience spiritual renewal. Thus it is clear that time can be understood and experienced in different ways. Moreover, as Maritain points out, the focus of American culture on scheduled activities tends to leave little room for unscheduled time.

Yet the clock time of schedules, clocks, and calendars differs from the time of lived experience and the time of spiritual activity. I will designate as "lived time" the time of actual human experience in the real world, experience which varies qualitatively according to that which is experienced. Actual human experience is relational, an experience-of something. Any description of lived time focuses on the experience itself, both the experiencing and that which is experienced, i.e., the event through which one lives, and describes the duration of the event in terms of the actual experience. For example, the lived time of intense experiences such as birth and death, joy and sorrow, is uneven, not because of a subjective distortion, but rather because the experiences themselves are relational and not uniform. As a result,

¹¹ Ibid., pp. 156-57.

¹² Josef Pieper, *Leisure, the Basis of Culture*, newly translated by Gerald Malsbury with an introduction by Roger Scruton (South Bend, Indiana: St. Augustine's Press, 1998), pp. 30-34.

¹³ Ibid., p. 35.

lived time is not susceptible to precise scheduling.¹⁴ The duration of significant human events tends to expand or to contract in comparison to the clock. When the importance of lived time is acknowledged, the human activities or events take priority over the schedule. Human activities include spiritual activity, and I will call the time of spiritual activity "sacred time." This is a distinctive form of lived time in which human activity is directed toward eternity and opens itself to the presence of God. Like lived experience in general, religious experience overflows any attempt to confine it to a precise schedule. Many people, atheists for example, could acknowledge lived time without acknowledging sacred time. Nevertheless, for those who admit that human beings are directed towards eternal life and have an intrinsic relation to spiritual reality, it is reasonable to consider sacred time to be the lived time of religious experience and spiritual activity.

Some ways of thinking about and of experiencing time rule out sacred time and spiritual activity, and exclude any intersection of the temporal and the spiritual. One such understanding is the "inhuman and materialist" *mythos* of industrial civilization,¹⁵ which emphasizes and depends on systems, schedules, and functions. The system takes precedence over the people who are involved in it. As Maritain says in *Integral Humanism*:

In the present civilization, everything is referred to a measure which is not human, but external to man: primarily to laws belonging to material production, to the technological domination of nature and to the utilization of all the forces of the world for the fecundity of money.¹⁶

¹⁴ However, the structure of lived time can be described in terms of the horizons of protention and retention. See Edmund Husserl, *On the Phenomenology of the Consciousness of Internal Time (1893-1917)*, revised English trans. John B. Brough (Dordrecht: Kluwer, 1991), and Maurice Merleau-Ponty, *Phenomenology of Perception*, trans. Colin Smith (London: Routledge, 1962), pp. 410-33.

¹⁵ Jacques Maritain, *Reflections on America*, p. 21.

¹⁶ Jacques Maritain, *Integral Humanism*, p. 191.

Nevertheless, Maritain distinguishes between the people who live in a society and "the externally superimposed *structure or ritual of civilization*." In *Reflections on America*, he expresses hope that the spirit of the American people will overcome "the logic of the structure."¹⁷ Forty-some years later, there are still grounds for hope. However, in our post-industrial civilization, the "logic of the structure" of American culture increasingly dictates the primacy of profit and promotes mindless entertainment. The relentless pursuit of material ends and of the lowest common denominator focuses on the temporal to the exclusion or marginalization of the spiritual.¹⁸ Moreover, the cultural emphasis on schedules and functions presupposes a particular understanding of time that cultivates a material and instrumental view of the human person.

An understanding of time and an understanding of what it is to be human are bound together. Human beings are finite and must decide which activities are most important in their lives. Given the physical and temporal limitations that define human finiteness, the activities dominant in a culture reflect a collective choice about how human beings should live and an implicit view about the nature of the human person. It is necessary, then, to ask about the nature of the person who lives and acts in this world.

In *The Person and the Common Good*, Maritain distinguishes between the person and the individual. The person, considered as a whole, can live a spiritual life directed towards eternity. Thanks to human freedom and the human intellect, the person is capable of both knowledge and love, which transcend the temporal world.¹⁹ However, the individual, considered as the material aspect of the person, belongs only to the temporal world. Maritain describes the material individuality of the person in unflattering terms, as "the detestable ego whose law is to

¹⁷ Jacques Maritain, *Reflections on America*, pp. 21-23.

¹⁸ Although 90% of Americans say they believe in God, the culture is structured by an economic system that gives primacy to money and material possessions.

¹⁹ Jacques Maritain, *The Person and The Common Good* (1946), trans. John J. Fitzgerald (Notre Dame, Indiana: University of Notre Dame Press, 1966), p. 39.

grasp or to absorb for itself.”²⁰ The material individual is best understood as the modern individual, the isolated and self-interested Hobbesian being who competes for survival and advantage in the material world.²¹ Maritain’s description of the material individual in terms of the modern individual is justified by modernity’s emphasis on the material. For example, Hobbes’ mechanistic determinism underlies his account of human nature as greedy, grasping, self-interested, ruled by the passions, etc.²² Hobbes and the later empiricists argued for universal mechanism, and the successes of natural science appeared to contribute to the plausibility of modern empiricism. Contemporary physicalism, along the same lines, concludes that the human being is only the material individual.

A major factor contributing to this view of the human being is the modern understanding of the world in terms of clock time. The modern material individual lives by the modern conception of time, which originated in Western culture with the invention of the mechanical clock. As I have argued elsewhere,²³ the mechanical clock in turn served as a model for and helped to inspire the theory of universal mechanism which, despite its deficiencies, continues to have a tremendous effect

²⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 44.

²¹ I believe that Maritain’s hylomorphism is not particularly helpful here. Material individuality cannot be identified with animality, for a person focusing his or her life on material individuality still uses the intellect. If the animal body of the person is matter and the rational soul is form, it follows that the animal body of the person cannot be the same as “the detestable ego.” The human being does not choose to be embodied, but does choose whether or not to focus on materiality.

²² Hobbes’ famous account of the state of nature occurs in *Leviathan* (1660), chapters XIII-XV (<http://oregonstate.edu/instruct/phl302/texts/hobbes/leviathan-contents.html>). He gives his mechanistic account of causality in *Concerning Body* (1656), chapter XXV, contained in *Human Nature and De Corpore Politico*, ed. J.C.A. Gaskin (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), pp. 212-30.

²³ Teresa I. Reed, “Time in Relation to Self, World, and God,” in *Faith, Scholarship, and Culture in the 21st Century*, eds. Alice Ramos and Marie I. George (Washington, D.C: American Maritain Association, 2002), pp. 166-77.

on people's understanding of the universe and of themselves. The modern conception of time focuses on clock time, to the exclusion of lived time and sacred time.

So far, I have distinguished several understandings of time and sketched an account of modern civilization in relation to time and the human person. In order to demonstrate the connection between clock time and the modern material individual, I will describe the origins, advantages and disadvantages of clock time.

Clock time, the time of schedules, clocks, and calendars, has a firm foundation in reality and human experience. However, clock time also becomes detached from actual human experience. To see this, consider that a clock's purpose is time measurement and that time measurement is really about relations among events. People want to measure two things about events, so they can talk intelligibly with each other about past and present events and make plans for future events. The two things to be measured are "when" and "how long." "When" refers to how an event is related to other events, in the specific sense of its temporal "location" with respect to before and after.²⁴ (For example: before the Battle of Waterloo; at dawn; after I went on vacation.) "How long" refers to the duration of an event, its relative permanence, how long it lasts.²⁵ (For example: all morning; for a little while; through the

²⁴ "Before and after" (or "earlier and later") and "past, present, and future" are equally basic ways in which we describe the location and duration of real events and our experience of them. McTaggart's reduction of the B series (earlier and later) to the A series (past, present, and future) allows him to extend the fixed relations of the past to the whole of time. This extension is illegitimate. McTaggart's argument is a classic case of substituting an abstracted structure (the timeline) for the real events from which it was abstracted in the first place. Of course, his metaphysical idealism does not permit him to make that distinction. For a concise version of McTaggart's argument, reprinted from *Mind* (1908), see "The Unreality of Time," in *Time*, eds. Jonathan Westphal and Carl Levinson (Indianapolis, Indiana: Hackett, 1993), pp. 94-111.

²⁵ For the realist, duration and passage are features of real events of all kinds. Time exists as a real aspect of real events, including human experiences. Both change and the lack of change can have duration. Augustine's argument

summer.) The “when” and the “how long” of a real event can be observed, lived through experience, theorized about, inferred on the basis of evidence, and/or measured. Measurement requires a comparison to other events.

The two major kinds of time measurement are calendars and clocks, both of which depend on real events. Calendars are based on astronomy, beginning with the “natural” units of the day, lunar month, and solar year.²⁶ There are various types of calendars (lunar, solar, mixed), and all calendars have conventional elements, but any calendar allows us to compare one event to another, with respect to both “when” and “how long.” (For example: in 1995; before last week; on the 10th through the 12th of June; for 5 days.) Similarly, a clock is only a uniform motion machine. The units are conventional but founded upon a real oscillation (“tick”), to which other motions and changes can be compared. The “accuracy” of a clock depends on the uniformity of the oscillation, and the oscillation is most uniform when it has the smallest frequency.²⁷ A process of abstraction is involved in both kinds of time

against duration, that the present time has no length because any given length of time contains a before and an after (*Confessions*, Book 11, chapter XV), actually supports the view that time is continuous. Aristotle (*Physics*, Book VI, chapter 1, 231a21-231b20) successfully shows that time cannot be assembled out of discrete nows, and that the units of time measurement are both conventional and made possible by the continuity of time. “Time itself,” as Yves Simon argues, is a concept founded on reality. Yet Simon’s discussion of duration is complicated by his failure to distinguish between the two senses of “eternity,” outside of time or everlasting for all time. See *The Great Dialogue of Nature and Space*, ed. Gerard J. Dalcourt (South Bend, Indiana: St. Augustine’s Press, 2001), chapter VII.

²⁶ On the calendar, see E. G. Richards, *Mapping Time: The Calendar and its History* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998) and Bonnie Blackburn and Leofranc Holford-Stevens, *The Oxford Companion to the Year* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999).

²⁷ The most accurate clock, the Cs-133 atomic clock, subdivides the second by defining it as “the duration of 9,192,631,770 periods of the radiation corresponding to the transition between the two hyperfine levels of the ground state of the Cesium-133 atom.” This level of accuracy is required for

measurement, as people learn to read a calendar and to "tell time" by a clock. Numbers are attached to centuries, years, months, days, hours, minutes, seconds. Although calendars are given a graphical representation, and thus remain relatively abstract, clocks are actually constructed: a clock is an artifact, a physical, real thing. Whether analog or digital, a clock sets forth not only its own presence but also the presence of clock time itself. "Clock time itself," however, is a being of reason, a concept, an abstraction, based on the process of comparing changes to each other and using one change as a measure for others. A version of the fallacy of misplaced concreteness occurs when people not only apply the abstracted structure to real events, but also forget the real events upon which the structure is based, and then consider the abstracted structure to be more important than the real events that take place within it.

This fallacy is encouraged by the usefulness of clock time. Clock time allows natural science to carry out precise measurements of chemical, physical and biological processes. Precise time-keeping enables navigation to be correct. Clock time permits an industrial economy to reorganize human work by work schedules, multiple shifts, and hourly wages. Transportation, utility, and communication networks rely on closely timed schedules. And, for everyday life, clocks and calendars allow the synchronization of all kinds of human gatherings. These advantages of clock time should not be underestimated. Not only are they convenient, but they also rapidly become indispensable to the functioning of a society.²⁸

However, there are also disadvantages arising from a dependence on clock time. Clock time replaces the continuity of lived time with an abstract structure of countable units. This discrete conception of time grants priority to schedules, so that the schedule provides a structure for human events and human events must conform to the schedule.

the Global Positioning System and other precision technologies. A quartz crystal clock can measure only thousandths of a second.

²⁸ Although the disruptions predicted for the Year 2000 fizzled, the predictions drew attention to the nation's infrastructure and its dependence on technological timekeeping.

The impersonal and mechanical functioning of the clock, and related abstractions such as the monetary system, underlie the “logic of the structure” of the industrial and post-industrial societies that make up modern civilization. According to Maritain, modern civilization threatens “not only the earthly happiness of the community” but also “[menaces] the life of the soul, the spiritual destiny of the person.”²⁹ Considering modern civilization in relation to time, the earthly happiness of the community is threatened, because clock time tends to displace the lived time of actual human experience, and the spiritual destiny of the person is menaced, because clock time reduces the person to the material individual.

First, clock time tends to displace the lived time of actual human experience. Lived time, in contrast to clock time, respects the unevenness and non-uniformity of experience. People’s experiences of joy, sorrow, creativity, suffering, birth, death, and other significant happenings in their lives differ with respect to actual duration.³⁰ Any description of lived time focuses on the actual events through which one lives. It is simply inappropriate, a category mistake, to impose a precise schedule on such significant events. Yet a clock-driven culture attempts to do just that, resulting in absurdities such as “personal time,” “quality time,” specified length-of-stay in a hospital, and so forth. The schedule is rigid, artificial, and impersonal, while the human events that are scheduled are often quite the opposite—flexible, natural, and highly personal. The advantages of the schedule lead people to give priority to the abstracted structures of clock time instead of the real, human and natural events of actual experience. This threatens the earthly happiness of the community as people are torn between what they know to be important and what they can fit into the schedule. Although I think most people are aware of the conflict and

²⁹ Jacques Maritain, *Integral Humanism*, p. 137.

³⁰ Clock time is objective, but it is not the case that lived time is subjective. Rather, lived time is relational and intersubjective. It is relational because it is always the duration of a real experience of something. It is intersubjective because personal experience does not have to be unique. People have many or most of these experiences in common, so that the common features and structures of experiences can be described phenomenologically.

find it disturbing, there is tremendous social and economic pressure to accept the primacy of the schedule.

When clock time is given priority, human events and activities are reduced to scheduled functions. So, secondly, clock time reduces the human person to the material individual who performs those functions. It becomes very easy to see human beings simply as means to the perpetuation of the structure, particularly when people themselves grant priority to the value of efficiency and think of their own value in terms of their scheduled accomplishments. The dominance of clock time forces human activities into an abstract structure which is dehumanizing because it is reductionist.³¹ People are reduced to their material and productive functions, i.e., to material individuals who compete for limited resources and who are valued only insofar as they fit into the "functionalized world." Gabriel Marcel uses the phrase "functionalized world" to describe the society which "equate[s] [an] individual's identity with his or her functions." He says, "The frightful expression, *the use of one's time*, is in this context most significant. Precise amounts of time are allotted for various functions."³² Similarly, according to Josef Pieper,

[T]he work-a-day world is the world of the working day, the world of usefulness, of purposeful action, of accomplishment, of the exercising of functions; it is the world of supply and demand, the world of hunger and the satisfaction of hunger. It is a world dominated by one goal: the realization of the "common utility"; it is the world of work, to the extent that work is synonymous with "useful activity."³³

In that clearly instrumental view of the human being, failure to carry out one's functions means that one becomes useless. Moreover, the human being is considered to be a purely natural phenomenon divisible into

³¹ People who work on computers are well aware that their productivity can be calculated down to the second.

³² Gabriel Marcel, "Concrete Approaches to Investigating the Ontological Mystery," in *Gabriel Marcel's Perspectives on the Broken World*, trans. K. R. Hanley (Milwaukee, Wisconsin: Marquette University Press, 1998), p. 173.

³³ Joseph Pieper, *Leisure*, p. 64.

functions. The division of the human being into a collection of functions leads toward a focus on particular and technical problems and away from a sense of the whole person. This produces a fragmentation of personality, according to Marcel.³⁴ Maritain agrees, for the human being as a collection of vital and social functions is precisely the modern material individual, and material individuality is “inclined to fall” into a dispersion or dissolution of personality.³⁵ It is very difficult to have a sense of the center of one’s being, the whole of one’s life and its meaning and purpose, when that life is divided into time slots to be used for separate functions.³⁶

So the dominance of clock time produces and reinforces a material, instrumental, and fragmented view of the human being. It also requires people to stuff the most significant events of their lives into time slots, and makes it difficult for people to justify activities that appear to have no useful function (such as philosophy). This menaces the life of the soul and the spiritual destiny of the person, as ultimate questions about the self and the meaning and purpose of human life are replaced by techniques (how-to’s) for improving particular functions.

The human person, however, is more than a collection of functions. Resistance to the functionalized world occurs in many ways: family life, vacations, parish work, hobbies, fishing, and so on, can resist the schedule and permit both creativity and wholeness.³⁷ However, each of these activities can also be turned into a function and sucked back into the relentless whirl of the rat race which is ruled by the clock.³⁸ It is

³⁴ Gabriel Marcel, *op. cit.*, p. 175.

³⁵ Jacques Maritain, *The Common Good*, pp. 44-45.

³⁶ The psychologizing of religion is a tribute to the power of a naturalistic and functional account of the person.

³⁷ There are also less constructive forms of resistance, such as obscurantism, escapism, passivity, sabotage, etc.

³⁸ This description evokes Heidegger’s description of everyday Da-sein as “falling prey” and being constantly torn away from authenticity into the eddy or whirl(pool) of everydayness. See Martin Heidegger, *Being and Time* (1953), trans. Joan Stambaugh (Albany, New York: State University of New York Press, 1996), §38, pp. 164-68.

necessary to restore an understanding of lived time in order to provide an alternative to the functionalized world.

In contrast to the clock time which gives priority to schedules, the lived time of human events gives priority to human activities. Many of the realities of human experience, by their nature and by their importance, overflow the schedule. As a result, an acknowledgment of lived time entails an openness to activities that are not schedule-driven, activities such as healing; grieving; caring for babies; raising small children; being creative; cultivating a friendship; building a consensus; practicing contemplation; participating in liturgical and sacramental life. To understand such activities, which are event-driven and not schedule-driven, it is necessary to think of them in relation to human development and human fulfillment. In that context, schedules are incidental and subordinate to the activities and processes themselves.

Consequently, instead of emphasizing schedules and functions, an understanding of lived time encourages the person to live as a person and not just as a material individual. Whereas clock time promotes an instrumental view of the human being as a "means only" to accomplish useful functions, lived time is open to the fulfillment of the human being and to the person as end.³⁹ The lived time of human events acknowledges the relational aspect of experiences, as experiences-of that differ in both duration and significance. (For example: my grief over the loss of a loved one; the healing of the wound on my foot. These are personal experiences of something real and their duration varies.) Lived time brings into focus both what is experienced and who is experiencing. The one who is experiencing cannot be understood as a collection of functions, but must be understood as an acting person. Thus, the modern material individual gives way to the person who is an end and who acts toward ends. As a result, lived time permits the intersection of the temporal and the spiritual in sacred time, the time

³⁹ As John F. Crosby observes, "as subjective person I am not a mere instrumental means for producing results, but am called to realize through my acting entirely non-instrumental meanings that express, among other things, my being as end in myself" *The Selfhood of the Human Person* (Washington, D.C.: The Catholic University of America Press, 1996), p. 113.

of religious experience and spiritual activity in which the person is directed toward the good of eternal life. Moreover, as Maritain points out, temporal activity is subordinate to spiritual activity. Thus, because the ultimate end of the person is eternal life, the lived time of ordinary activity is subordinate to the sacred time of spiritual activity, in its significance for the reality of the human person.

The human person faces a number of dilemmas in contemporary American society, and one of them is how to live with clock time and the structure it places on human activity. Maritain hoped that the American love of freedom and sense of morality would contribute a vital energy toward "overcoming and breaking the logic of the structure."⁴⁰ However, the person must acknowledge and cooperate with schedules and functions in order to act in this world. How can lived time in general, and sacred time in particular, be respected in a culture organized by clock time? How can spiritual life be acknowledged, respected, and encouraged in a temporal culture dominated by a material and instrumental view of the person?

I suggest that, first, reflection on different understandings of time can call attention to cultural assumptions about time, schedules, and functions, and make possible a more comprehensive view. Americans can learn from other cultures that seek a better balance between clock time and lived time.⁴¹ It is unreasonable to expect people to give up the advantages of schedules, clocks, and calendars, but it is possible to show the limitations of clock time and to emphasize lived time, which focuses on the depth and quality of human experience. Secondly, since the difference between clock time and lived time is closely related to the difference between the material individual as a part and the human person as a whole, it is necessary to put systems and schedules in perspective by challenging the naturalistic and functional account of the human being and by drawing attention to the ultimate meaning and purpose of human life. Maritain points out that "materialistic

⁴⁰ Jacques Maritain, *Reflections on America*, p. 23.

⁴¹ See Edward T. Hall, *The Dance of Life: The Other Dimension of Time* (New York; Doubleday Anchor, 1983), and Alfred Gell, *The Anthropology of Time: Cultural Constructions of Temporal Maps and Images* (Oxford: Berg, 1996).

conceptions of the world and life... do not recognize the spiritual and eternal element in man... [and] cannot satisfy the requirements of the person."⁴² Of course, the person is in this world and yet not of this world. The person as such transcends the temporal world,⁴³ and no version of temporal life will be sufficient to satisfy the human soul who finds ultimate happiness in God. Nevertheless, it is worthwhile to advocate an understanding of time that, far from constricting the human person into this world, opens the human person to eternal life.

⁴² Jacques Maritain, *The Common Good*, pp. 100-01.

⁴³ *Ibid.*, pp. 69-70.