Form and Fluidity:  
The Aquinian Roots of Maritain's  
Doctrine of the Spiritual Preconscious  

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In *Creative Intuition in Art and Poetry* Jacques Maritain roots his notion of poetic intuition in a philosophic doctrine of the human intellect's precon­scious life. This life that is found in the highest part of the intellective soul. Here, says Maritain, aesthetic creativity begins in a flash of intuitive in­sight. In an effort to provide a philosophic foundation for his teaching on the spiritual preconscious, Maritain calls upon two teachings of St. Thomas Aquinas: Aquinas's teaching on the agent intellect, and his teaching that the powers of the soul flow from the soul's essence. It is this teaching on the flow of powers from the soul that particularly interests me in this paper. After a brief account of Maritain's appropriation of these two teachings in *Creative Intuition*, I shall examine Aquinas's teaching on the flow of pow­ers, so as to lay bare the Aquinian roots of Maritain's teaching.  

I  

At the highest reaches of our intellective life, says Maritain, the illumi­nating intellect is ceaselessly in act. It does not itself know, but it is the source of our knowing. It is "the primal quickening source of all intellec­tual activity";¹ its light activates and permeates every operation of the mind.² While this illuminating activity of the agent intellect is above the level of awareness, and thus not immediately known to us, it is a legitimate target of philosophic inquiry. If we would grasp the full scope of the do-

² Ibid., p. 99.
main of intellect, we must look "beneath the sunlit surface thronged with explicit concepts and judgments," to the "primordial translucid night of the intimate vitality of the soul," to the intellect's living springs.

Maritain next appeals to Aquinas's teaching that the powers of the soul flow from its essence. In this "ontological procession," as Maritain calls it, one power of the soul proceeds from the soul's essence through the mediation of another. There is an order to this procession: the more perfect powers are the efficient and final cause of the powers they beget: from the power of intellect flows the imaginative power, and from the imaginative power flow the sense powers. The ontologically posterior power serves the prior power: the senses serve the imagination, and through the imagination, the intellect. Maritain says this teaching of Aquinas shows that there is an "immense dynamism working upwards and downwards along the depths of the soul."

Maritain asserts that it is at the common root of the soul's powers, in the soul's essence—where all of these powers are active in common and are quickened and enveloped by reason—that we find the home of creative intuition. From the common root of the soul's powers there is outflow to the sense powers, and the reflow of the harvests of imagination and sense upward to the depths of the soul, fecundating creative intuition.

Maritain's teaching follows Aquinas's teaching on the flow of powers from the soul in question 77 of the prima pars. I shall now examine Aquinas's own teaching. I shall first endeavor to place Aquinas's teaching in its historical context, by summarizing the teachings of several other thirteenth-century thinkers on the relation of the powers of the soul to the soul's essence. This will allow appreciation of the originality of Aquinas's teaching. I shall then examine the teaching of Aquinas himself.

II

Aquinas has two ex professo treatments of the question of the order and flow of powers from the soul: one is in ST I, q. 77, a. 4–7, which we have already mentioned; the other is found in I Sent., d. 3, q. 4, a. 2–3. In both treatments the question of the flow of powers is forerun by a more fundamental question, namely, whether the soul is its own power, or put another way, whether the essence of the soul is identical to its powers. By the time

3 Ibid., pp. 94, 100.
4 Ibid., p. 91.
5 Ibid., p. 109.
6 Ibid., p. 110.
7 Ibid., p. 99.
Aquinas takes up this question, it has a long history. An important line of that history—perhaps the most important one for the thirteenth-century scholastics—begins with Augustine. In an objection at the very start of the Summa's treatment of the identity of soul and power, Aquinas cites Augustine's De Trinitate: "Augustine says that memory, intelligence, and will are one life, one mind, one essence." The critical point is that Augustine finds in the union of these powers the image of the union of the three divine Persons.

Centuries later, when in his Sentences Peter Lombard discusses the assignation of the image of God in man, Augustine's formula is prominent. The Lombard asks how the three faculties of memory, intelligence, and will can constitute one essence, and yet be distinguished. He concludes the three faculties are one substance because they inhere in the soul substantially, not as accidents that can be present or not present. The weighty auctoritas of Augustine, and the influence of the Lombard as author of the Sentences, assure that any thirteenth-century discussion of the identity of power and essence must reckon with Augustine's formula that this triad of powers is one essence, and thus with the yoking of this question with the question of the imago Dei in man. These will profoundly influence the way the question is posed and answered up to and beyond Aquinas.

In the early part of the thirteenth century this Augustinian, Trinitarian psychology confronts—in the newly translated works of Aristotle—an Aristotelian psychology that coolly distinguishes powers without adverting to theological teaching. Finding themselves in the confluence of these two doctrinal streams, the great thinkers of the day join issue on the question of the relation of essence to power. Some oppose Aristotle, while others attempt somehow to graft the teachings of Aristotle and Augustine.

We pick up this story in the 1230s, in the twenty years or so before Aquinas writes his commentary on the Sentences. At this time we may discern two basic positions on the relation of the soul to its powers. The first position maintains that the soul and its powers are one identical reality. Perhaps the most stalwart defender of this position, and certainly the most influential, is William of Auvergne, Bishop of Paris beginning in 1228, and...

8 ST I, q. 77, a. 1, obj. 1.
9 Peter Lombard, I Sent., d. 3., c. 2 (ed. Quaracchi).
10 In this division I have followed Odon Lottin, "L'Identité de l'âme et de ses facultés pendant la première moitié du XIIIème siècle," Revue néoscolastique de philosophie 36 (1934), pp. 195-204. The same basic division is described in the scholion of the Quaracchi editors at Bonaventure's I Sent., d. 3, p. 2, a. 1, q. 3 (ed. Quaracchi, vol. 1, p. 87).
chancellor of the University of Paris. William holds that the soul is a substance that is absolutely simple and one. It can have no composition whatsoever. The soul cannot possess faculties that are essentially distinct from it, for this would destroy its absolute unity. To the extent that we speak of an intellect or will or sense power, we are speaking of various “offices” that the one, selfsame soul performs. *Ego sum quae intelligo,* says William; I am the one who understands. It is I who know, I who will and desire. It is I who remain one and undivided through these acts. He translates this experience of the person’s unity in acting into the language of substance and accident: if these acts are mine, they are the acts of my substance. These acts are not mine if they are the acts of accidents—an imbecility, for every man knows within that it is he who acts. The conclusion to be drawn from this is that memory, intelligence, will, and all other powers are really the soul itself: *anima humana et una est, et unum est.* Again, to the extent that we speak of different powers we really mean that the one soul has diverse objects of action, not that there is any diversity in the soul itself.

We can see how those who hold this position would find in Augustine’s words—that memory, intelligence, and will and one life, one mind, one essence—the affirmation of their position, and of the profound unity of man. They would worry that the application of the term “accident” to the powers of the soul (particularly the triad) makes these powers adventitious or incidental.

The second position—still in the twenty years before Aquinas—is represented by the Franciscans Alexander of Hales, John de la Rochelle, and Odo Rigaldus. These thinkers distinguish three ways in which the powers


12 “Et quamquam intelligere virtuti intellectivae attribuatur, velleque et desiderare virtuti desiderativae atque voluntati, ipsa tamen anima una est qua intelligit, vult atque desiderat, et hoc omnis anima humana sentit in semetipsa, cognoscit certissime, atque testificatur, nec possibile est ei ut mentiatuper super hoc. Absque enim ulla dubitatione constantissimeque asserter apud semetipsam et in seipsa: Ego sum quae intelligo, quae scio, quae cognosco, quae volo, quae appeto, quae desidero, quae desideria seu volita inquiro et, cum possibile est et licet, acquirvo volita, desiderata et appetita. Ego, inquam, una et indivisa manens per omnia haec, alioquin nec scire, nec intelligere, nec ullo modorum cognoscere ciuscumque virtutis quid esset, sicut evidenter declaratum est tibi in proxime praecedentibus” (*De anima,* chap. 3, part 10; as cited in Étienne Gilson, “Pourquoi Saint Thomas a critiqué saint Augustin.” *Archives d’histoire doctrinale et littéraire du moyen âge* 1 [1926–27], p. 54, n. 1).
might be in the soul: essentially, substantially, or accidentally. They exclude the first, an essential identity of the powers, *pace* William of Auvergne. Only in God are essence and power identical. Like William, however, they exclude an accidental inherence of the powers, showing the same concern that accidental means adventitious. They adopt a middle position: the powers of memory, intelligence, and will are *one substance* with the soul. In this they count themselves faithful followers of Augustine.\(^{13}\)

Bonaventure’s position resembles the position just described, though he makes some noteworthy precisions. Faithful to Augustine, he affirms that the *imago Dei* in man is found in the unity of the three powers in one essence, and that the three powers are *consubstantial* with the soul.\(^{14}\) In the *Itinerarium*, Bonaventure expresses this unity of powers this way: these three powers are “consubstantial, co-equal, co-aeval, and circumincissive.”\(^{15}\) One can sense in this formulation how much the issue of the *imago Dei* in man forms his thinking about the unity of powers and essence.

When Bonaventure asks whether the three powers are one in essence with the soul, he agrees with his Franciscan forebears: the powers are one with the soul substantially, not essentially (which is too strong) or accidentally (which is too weak). But he introduces this important refinement: the powers “go out” (the verb is *egredior*) immediately from the soul.\(^{16}\) “They go out and they do not recede, like splendor from light.”\(^{17}\) They go out so as to differ from essence, but not such as to pass into the genus of accident.\(^{18}\) They are consubstantial with the soul.

The metaphors Bonaventure uses to describe the relation of soul and power are of interest as we prepare to turn to Aquinas. There is the

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\(^{13}\) In this paragraph I have relied on Lottin, “L’Identité de l’âme et de ses facultés,” pp. 198–204.

\(^{14}\) Among many places see Bonaventure, *Collationes in Hexaemeron*, II, 27 (ed. Quaracchi, vol. 5).


\(^{16}\) “*Contingit iterum nominare potentias animae, ut immediate egrediuntur a substantia, ut per haec tria: memoriam, intelligentiam et voluntatem. Et hoc patet, quia omni accidente circumscripto, intellecto quod anima sit substantia spiritualis, hoc ipso quod est sibi praesens et sibi coniuncta, habet potentiam ad memorandum et inteligendum et diligendum se. Unde istae potentiae sunt animae consubstantiales et sunt in eodem genere per reductionem, in quo est anima. Attamen, quoniam egrediuntur ab anima—potentia enim se habet per modum egredientis—non sunt omnino idem per essentiam, nec tamen adeo differunt, ut sint alterius generis, sed sunt in eodem genere per reductionem*” (Bonaventure, I *Sent.*, d. 3, p. 2, a. 1, q. 3 [ed. Quaracchi, vol. 1]).

\(^{17}\) “*Exit et non recedit, ut splendor a luce*” (ibid.).

\(^{18}\) “*Quia enim egreditur, ideo differt, sed non transit in aliud genus*” (ibid.).
metaphor of going out from the soul.\textsuperscript{19} This conveys the dynamic unity of essence and power. Second is the metaphor of light: the powers are the soul’s splendor, or outshining. In Bonaventure’s light metaphysic, light propagates itself without transmutation, and with self-consonance.\textsuperscript{20} We shall recall these images when we discuss Aquinas, to whom I now turn.\textsuperscript{21}

III

Since Aquinas’s discussion of the relation of the soul to its powers in his \textit{Sentences}, book I, distinction 3, is the first place he grapples with the received teaching we have briefly discussed, I shall direct most of my attention there, with occasional reference to Aquinas’s mature teaching in \textit{ST} I, q. 77. Straight away in the \textit{Sentences} Aquinas shows his desire to re-ask and re-order. Whereas Bonaventure, in the parallel location in his \textit{Sentences} commentary (book I, distinction 3), first asks whether the \textit{imago Dei} consists in memory, intelligence, and will, to which he responds affirmatively, Aquinas asks whether the mind is the subject of the \textit{imago} (I \textit{Sent.}, d. 3, q. 3, a. 1). Aquinas’s answer is an early expression of a teaching that will take fuller shape in \textit{ST} I, q. 93: man is made to the image of God inasmuch as he possesses an intellectual nature.\textsuperscript{22} Here in the \textit{Sentences} commentary emphasis is clearly shifted away from the triad of memory, intelligence, and will as the locus of the \textit{imago} in man. Thus, when Aquinas asks soon afterward (I \textit{Sent.}, d. 3, q. 4, a. 2), as does Bonaventure, whether the soul is its powers, he is, unlike Bonaventure, free to proceed without express concern to preserve the literal Augustinian formula when he defines the image of God in man.

\textsuperscript{19} Cf. Bonaventure, II \textit{Sent.}, d. 24, p. 1, a. 2, q. 1, ad 8 (ed. Quaracchi, vol. 2): “Prima enim agendi potentia, quae egressum dicitur habere ab ipsa substantia, ad idem genus reductur. . . .”

\textsuperscript{20} “Lux simul est et lucet et illuminat” (II \textit{Sent.}, d. 13, a. 1, q. 2, ad 4); “cum lucis sit ex se ipsa se ipsam multiplicare . . .” (II \textit{Sent.}, d. 13, a. 2, q. 1).

\textsuperscript{21} I leave aside a discussion of the position of Albert the Great. According to Lottin, while Albert makes some precisions that approach Aquinas’s position, he remains largely in the line of Franciscan thought on this issue; Lottin, “L’Identité de l’âme et de ses facultés,” pp. 205–08.

\textsuperscript{22} “Et ideo in illis tantum creaturis (i.e. the intellectual) dicitur esse imago Dei quae propter sui nobilitatem ipsum perfectius imitantur et repraesentant; et ideo in angelo et homine tantum dicitur imago divinitatis, et in homine secundum id quod est in ipso nobilius. Alia autem, que plus et minus participant de Dei bonitate, magis accedunt ad rationem imaginis” (Aquinas, I \textit{Sent.}, d. 3, q. 3, a. 1). The stress is on the \textit{imago}’s perfection and nobility in being, not on a trinity of powers. Cf. \textit{ST} I, q. 93, a. 1–7. “Sed quantum ad hoc non attenditur per se ratio divinae imaginis in homine, nisi prae supposita prima imitatione, quae est secundum intellectualen naturam . . .” (\textit{ST} I, q. 93, a. 3).
To this question whether the powers of the soul are its essence, Aquinas answers that in God, and in Him alone, are substance and operation the same. In every creature operation is an accident, and therefore the power that is the proximate principle of operation is an accident. This means that all the soul’s powers, including intellect and will, are in some sense accidents. On this point, then, Aquinas confronts an entire tradition, a small portion of which we surveyed above. He quickly shows, however, that he is not insensible to the concern of his predecessors that accidental might mean adventitious. He shows his sympathy with two critical precisions.

First, he says that the powers of the soul flow from the essence of the soul. Since the soul is a substance, he says, no operation goes forth (egreditur) from it except through the mediation of a power, and the soul’s powers flow from the essence of the soul itself (potentiae fluunt ab essentia ipsius animae). That is, in action there is a causal stream that flows from the soul through the power into operation. I suggest that Aquinas’s employment of the verb fluere shows that he wants us to envision the causality precisely as a stream, lest the distinction he has made between soul, power, and action should lead us to sunder the three from each other. The image of fluidity serves to unite what has been distinguished, and combats the tendency to make distinct powers discrete.

Second, he distinguishes proper accidents, which flow from the principles of the species, from common accidents, which flow from the principles of the individual. Intellect, will, and suchlike are proper accidents. These “follow upon” and “originate from” the principles of the species, he says. They are necessarily present wherever the species is.23

The way is thereby prepared for the question of the article that immediately follows: whether one power arises (orior) from another (I Sent., d. 3, q. 4, a. 3). Aquinas answers: manyness that comes forth from some one thing must come forth according to an order, because from one thing, only

23 “Similiter dicho, quod ab anima, cum sit substantia, nulla operatio egreditur, nisi mediante potentia: nec etiam a potentia perfecta operatio, nisi mediante habitu. Hae autem potentiae fluunt ab essentia ipsius animae, quaedam ut perfectiones partium corporis, quarum operatio efficitur mediante corpore, ut sensus, imaginatio, et huiusmodi; et quaedam ut existentes in ipsa anima, quarum operatio non indiget corpore, quod sunt accidentia: non quod sint communia accidentia, quae non fluunt ex principiis speciei, sed consequuntur principia individui; sed sicut propria accidentia, quae consequuntur speciem, originata ex principiis ipsius: ipsius simul tamen sunt de integritate ipsius animae. inquantum est totum potentiale, habens quamdam perfectionem potentiae, quae conficitur ex diversis viribus” (Aquinas, I Sent., d. 3, q. 4, a. 2. Cf. ST I, q. 77, a. 1, ad 5).
a unity can proceed \((\textit{ex uno non exit nisi unum})\). Therefore, since many powers go out \((\textit{egredior})\) from the soul, they must have a natural order; and since each flows from the soul, one must flow by the mediation of another.\(^{24}\)

Notice that Aquinas first says that the powers “go out” \((\textit{egredior})\), and then adds, they not only go out, but flow out. For Aquinas, I suggest, “flow” completes \textit{egressus} by deepening the notion of the causal communication from soul to power. In the text at hand, Aquinas wants to show that there is an order among the powers precisely because there is a causal flow by which the soul \textit{communicates its unity to the powers}—a unity that shows forth in the order among the powers. There is, then, not just going out, but serial, causal flow.

Elsewhere Aquinas says more about the dynamics of this causal flow. In one place he says: “As the efficacy \((\textit{virtus})\) of the soul’s essence is left \((\textit{relinquitur})\) in a power, so the efficacy of prior powers is found in subsequent powers, such that in one power the efficacy of many powers can be collected.”\(^{25}\) There is, in other words, a real communication of a \textit{virtus} from soul to power, and from power to power, so that the \textit{virtus} of the prior is deposited or “left” in the posterior power.\(^{26}\) Aquinas also speaks of a \textit{redun-}

\(^{24}\)“\textit{Omnis numerositas quae descendit naturaliter ab aliquo uno oportet quod descendat secundum ordinem, quia ab uno non exit nisi unum; et ideo cum multae potentiae egrediantur ab essentia animae, dicimus quod in potentis animae est ordo naturalis; et cum omnes fluant ab essentia, una tamen fluit mediante alia}” (Aquinas. \textit{I Sent.}, d. 3, q. 4, a. 3).

\(^{25}\)“\textit{Sic enim est in potentis animae, quod cum omnes ab essentia animae orientur, quasi proprietates ab essentialibus rei, est tamen quidam ordo huissmodi originis, ut scilicet origo unius potentiae originem alterius praesupponat, qua mediant quodammodo ab essentia animae procedat: quod ex actibus considerari potest. Actus enim unius potentiae necessario actum alterius praesupponit: sicut actus appetitivae actum apprehensivae: et inde est quod sicut virtus essentiae animae in potentia relinquitur, ita etiam virtus unius potentiae praecedentis relinquitur in subsecuenti; et inde est quod aliqua potentia virtutes plurium potentiarum in se colligit ...}” (Aquinas, \textit{II Sent.}, d. 24, q. 1, a. 2). In this article Thomas seeks to correct Bonaventure’s teaching that \textit{liberum arbitrium} is a habit resulting from the conjunction, or cooperation, of intellect and will (see Bonaventure, \textit{II Sent.}, d. 25, p. 1, a. 1, q. 4). He strives to correct Bonaventure’s notion of cooperation among powers with an ordered flow among powers.

\(^{26}\)A form’s productive causality of its proper accidents is an intimate communication of its whatness or suchness to the accident. The language of flow conveys this. See, for example, \textit{De Veritate}, q. 10, a. 1: “\textit{Sed anima humana pertingit ad altissimum gradum inter potentias animae et ex hoc denominatur, unde dicitur intellectiva et quandoque etiam intellectus, et similiter mens in quantum scilicet \textit{ex ipso nata} est effluere talis potentia}, quod est sibi proprium prae alii animabus (emphasis added). See also the end of the corpus of the same article.
dantia—a kind of reverberation—amongst the soul’s powers, of the flow and reflow of communication among them.27

In ST I, q. 77, a. 6–7, the mature treatment of this causal flow, Aquinas makes it clear that the soul is the productive cause of its powers.28 He says that the flow of the powers from the soul is not a transmutation but a natural resultatio, the way color naturally results from light.29 By resultatio Aquinas means to signify something easeful, or for lack of a better word, automatic, so much so that he says the resultatio of the properties of the soul from the soul itself is simul cum anima.30

Let us return to I Sent., d. 3, q. 4, a. 3, on whether one power arises from another. I would argue that since Aquinas has some version of Bonaventure’s Sentences in front of him as he writes his own commentary,31 Aquinas’s use of Bonaventure’s verb egredior is deliberate.32 What Aquinas is seeking to do is to develop what Bonaventure and the other medieval thinkers, to varying degrees, either missed or left underdeveloped, namely, the full meaning and depth of the causality exercised by essence with respect to its proper accidents, in which essence begets the serial flow of these accidents. (Bonaventure’s metaphors—going out, splendor—do not bespeak an ordered flow.) For Aquinas this causal flow explains the unity of the soul with its powers, and thus answers William of Auvergne’s concern to preserve the unity of man. It also ensures that the powers not be adventitious: the flow of powers from the soul is a necessary resultatio that

27 “Ex viribus superioribus fit redundantia in inferiores... Et everso ex viribus inferioribus fit redundantia in superiores” (De Veritate, q. 26, a. 10; cf. ST I-II, q. 38, a. 4, ad 3). It seems clear that for Aquinas, the causal flow within form is the condition for the intercommunication redundantia signifies. Notice the juxtaposing of fluere and redundantia in the following passage: “Quamvis potentiae sensitivae, secundum quorumdam opinionem, per suam essentiam non maneant post mortem, manent tamen in sua radice, scilicet in essentia animae, a qua potentiae fluunt: et sic manet peccatum sensualitas in anima, secundum quod peccatum unius potentiae in totum redundat” (Aquinas, I Sent., d. 24, q. 3, a. 2, ad 6).


29 “Emanatio proprium accidentium a subiecto non est per aliquam transmutationem, sed per aliquam naturalem resultationem, sicut ex uno naturaliter aliud resultat, ut ex luce color” (ST I, q. 77, a. 6, ad 3).

30 “Sicut potentia animae ab essentia fluit, non per transmutationem, sed per naturalen quandam resultationem, et est simul cum anima; ita est etiam de una potentia respectu alterior” (ST I, q. 77, a. 7, ad 1).


32 See notes 16 and 18 above.
is simul cum anima. Further, and what is very important, Aquinas pursues a properly metaphysical line of reasoning that is not directly beholden to a theological consideration of the image of God in man. He argues from the way that finite essence gives rise to its proper accidents. At the heart of Aquinas's attempt to redirect the tradition is a metaphysical insight into the nature of form and its proper fluidity.

IV

In concluding, I shall suggest a way in which these reflections on Aquinas's notion of form and fluidity might undergird Maritain's already rich psychology of creative intuition. In chapter 3 of Creative Intuition Maritain says that the spiritual unconscious could be called the musical unconscious, "for being one with the root activity of reason, it contains from the start a germ of melody."33 Thus he speaks of the "music of intelligence." In chapter 8 of Creative Intuition Maritain furthers this notion by saying that in the "fluid and moving milieu" of the preconscious, "a kind of music is involved";34 poetic intuition gives rise to intuitive pulsions—mental waves or vibrations charged with dynamic unity that constitute a musical stir. From this wordless, preconscious music springs artistic creativity.35

Aquinas would certainly agree that there is a music of intelligence. I believe, however, that his notion of form and fluidity bids us find music not only in intelligence, but a deepdown music in the very forms of things. When Aquinas uses the words fluere, ordo, relinquere, resultatio, redundantia in the manner we have seen, he is bidding us hearken to a music that is the internal life of form—any form. What is the ordered outwelling from essence to power to action but a kind of primeval music? While Maritain rightly speaks of a preconscious music of intelligence, Aquinas would stress, I suggest, that the music of intelligence is not first the music of the power of intellect, but the music of the immaterial essence that gives rise to intellect.36 This is a music which the power of intellect can harness, and to which it can apply its creativity, though it does not fully grasp its origin.

33 Maritain, Creative Intuition in Art and Poetry, p. 99.
34 Ibid., p. 301.
35 He cites Raïssa Maritain here: "Ce chant qui sans être encore formulé se compose au fond de l'âme—et qui demande à passer plus tard au dehors, à être chanté, voilà où se reconnaît l'expérience poétique proprement dite, dès l'origine orientée vers l'expression" (Creative Intuition in Art and Poetry, p. 301, n. 2).
36 See Aquinas, De Spiritualibus Creaturis, q. II, ad 12: "Ex hoc contingit quod ab essentia animae aliqua potentia fluent quae non est actus corporis, quia essentia animae excedit corporis proportionem, ut supra dictum est. . . . Ex immaterialitate essentiae sequitur immaterialitas potentiae." Cf. ST I, q. 79, a. 4, ad 5.
There is a beauty in Bonaventure’s evocation of an egress and outshining of powers from essence, but there is not music. In the fluidity that is simul cum anima there is music: the music of form; the music of being. Maritain points to the spiritual preconscious and says, rightly, “there is a kind of music here”; Aquinas points to form and says “there is a kind of music here.” Aquinas heard that music.