Somewhere in his Notebooks, Jacques Maritain brought up the question of the mission or activity of human souls after death. He wondered what function they might have with respect to those of us still in this world. Maritain suggested that after death human beings could be expected to remain interested in their loved ones and in the causes and purposes for which they devoted their lives while they were still on earth. If this theory is at all plausible, we can expect Maritain to be most interested in what those who read him still think of his *The Twilight of Civilization*, the Lecture to which these papers seek to address themselves.¹ No doubt, as many of the authors of this volume have remarked in one way or another, the major threats with which Maritain was immediately concerned in his Lecture of 1939--Nazism, Fascism, and now Marxism--have either disappeared or fallen on hard times. Maritain's thought would, at first sight, seem overcome by events. Events, however, have origins in the spirit, the attention to which is, at its highest, the vocation of the philosopher.

Yet the selection of this particular Parisian Lecture of Maritain for consideration in the final decade of the Twentieth Century was, on the part of the organizers of the University of San Francisco Maritain Conference, a shrewd one. The question immediately arises whether the thought that Maritain saw to be at the bottom of the most notoriously embodied ideologies of his time is, in any significant manner, undermined with the apparent demise of most of their representatives. It may

well have shifted, as several authors suspect, to more dangerous and subtle grounds—ones, in fact, closer to home.

"Nietzsche did not grasp," Maritain observed in his Lecture, "that man has no choice except between two roads: the road to Calvary and the road to the slaughter-house." This is, indeed, a memorable passage. The road to Calvary, while we live in the midst of suffering [Califano], is not the one that is being taken, though it could well, after all the other roads have been tried, appear to have been the most rational one after all; and our slaughter-houses—our abortion rates, our euthanasia temptations, our concentration camps, our drug consumption—we do not always admit them to be locales of human deaths or human deeds. We think this unclarity about what they are will enable us to live with them, to choose them. Our philosophies of pure choice have no objects of their choice except what they choose. Their merit is a ruthless consistency.

The essential sign of intellectual disorder is improperly to name what we are doing—what is. This can only happen on a massive scale if we permit a philosophy of subjective choice to replace a philosophy of being. The principle that Maritain most worried about was this: "that man alone and by himself alone works out his salvation." Notice that Maritain said that this would be the twilight not of man, but of civilization, an order that prided itself on upholding, not destroying, human life and worth.

Essentially, modernity describes itself as humanism [McInerny]. "Humanism" is a word with ancient derivations, from the Roman word humanitas. Humanitas is an abstract word coming from the Latin word homo, human being. It emphasizes those elevated and unique aspects that belong to man alone; hence its affinity to civilization. This is not Greek in origin because for the Greeks man was not the highest being, nor was politics the highest science. In a real sense, for the Greeks, man was most man when he was giving himself to divine things to which all human affairs, at least indirectly, were ordered. This was the teaching of Plato in the Republic and of Aristotle at the end of the Nichomachean Ethics. This is why Christianity is more of a Greek than a Roman thing in its philosophical roots.

Among the Romans, however, there was a tendency to exalt the practical sciences at the expense of the theoretical sciences. A certain

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2Ibid., 9.
3Ibid., 10.
autonomy began to appear in the post-Aristotelians, the Stoics and the Epicureans, that was taken up again in early modern times and developed further into a notion of humanism which claimed all independence from nature and nature's God. Humanism began to be conceived in opposition to the things of God. One had to choose between man and God, rather than to choose man through choosing God, which the revelational tradition had held. Humanism became secularized and atheist.

An understanding of humanism arose in which man was seen to be completely autonomous and malleable, grounded in nothing but himself. What man is, in this development, does not derive from an ordered nature itself dependent for its intelligibility on a source in a First Mind. For epistemological reasons, Hume's "the contrary of every matter of fact is possible," and Grotius's "the natural law would be the natural law even if God did not exist," were essential to justify autonomous humanism. According to the first, no knowledge of external order was possible since any fact could be otherwise. According to the second, the natural law depended on man himself if it were to have any intelligibility at all. The human mind was not subject to anything outside for any real knowledge. The classic idea of contemplation, of the possibility of receiving being and truth from what is other, was rejected. Man wanted to be his own cause. There are, no doubt, many ways in which this autonomy can manifest itself—through individualism, collectivism, liberalism, even conservatism. Modernity is essentially a working out in practice of these theoretical alternatives in the public order. They all produce their own worldly shape which we must inevitably confront with our minds to see what they are.

Maritain identified a number of different kinds of left and right humanisms. At its best, humanism was intended to manifest man’s original greatness by enabling him to partake of everything in nature and in history capable of enriching him. It requires both that man develop the latent tendencies he possesses, his creative powers and the life of reason, and that he work to transform into instruments of his liberty the forces of the physical universe.4

4Ibid., 3.
As it stands, this definition of humanism is compatible with Christianity if liberty is itself ordered to what is. Indeed, Maritain held that unless humanism is, in fact, open to all reality, including revelation, not merely its own constructs, it is not a true humanism. Maritain's intellectual career in art, metaphysics, epistemology, politics, and history was an effort to show how this open humanism is not only possible but required by truth itself. To defend man's glory, more than man has to be praised.

Those humanisms which affirm "human nature as closed in upon itself or absolutely self-sufficient" leave man with no limit but what man wills, and what man wills is not a theoretic limit, only another choice. Modernity, again, is the working out of these self-sufficient wills placed into reality by the philosopher-politician of this century. This disordered relation of art to politics, as Maritain saw it in his famous essay on Machiavelli, is what makes this sort of humanism most dangerous [Redpath]. When politics does not derive the ends of its human subjects from a what is that did not itself originate in man, it has no limits. The truth of politics becomes what the politician proposes for the good of the public order and his success in carrying it out. Freedom becomes simply the denial that there are limits, particularly limits deriving from what is or revelation.

Joseph Califano states modern humanism's problem very well in his essay:

Once man sought to be civilized; now man seeks merely to be free. Man seeks to be free in a total sense, that is, indeterminate sense where freedom makes no sense and freedom has no meaning. Man seeks to be free from the reality of himself and the reality of the other whether the other is another human person or God.

Califano's suspicion that suffering somehow gets to the heart of the problem is not only basic to the religion of Calvary but something that Maritain understood, particularly through his relation with his wife, Raissa. The slaughter-houses of modernity are populated with people who, on the basis of a philosophy of compassion and will, are to be put

\[5\text{Ibid., 4.}\]
out of their suffering. A mis-placed mercy, as Flannery O'Connor remarked has the most terrible of human consequences. The Greek idea that man learns by suffering, or the Christian idea that salvation is from the Cross—wherein evil lies in choice not suffering—are specifically rejected. Maritain's concern about the dire consequences of an autonomous humanism by no means out of date.

The essays in this book have asked the essential questions about the abidingness of Maritain's thought in our time. Are the good things produced in modern times rooted in that deeper humanism that came from Genesis and from the limits placed on this world when the City of God is properly located? Are the issues that lie at the heart of public disorder still products of that sort of modernity that produced the totalitarianisms of this century which we all now reject? The discussions on John Caputo [Boyle], Richard Rorty [Asselin], Allan Bloom [Hancock], Allen Tate [Dunaway], Jacques Derrida [Royal], and others take up the alternatives to the sort of solution that Maritain had proposed through the tradition of faith and reason. That this faith and reason dimension is the key intellectual issue—even if it must be undertaken in what are today obscure places over now almost forgotten thinkers like Maritain—should not be doubted.

Following Aristotle and St. Thomas, Maritain knew that civilizations rise and fall over the understanding of small errors in the beginning which lead to huge errors in the end. Maritain is sometimes accused of being perhaps too intellectual. No doubt he was, but great intelligence is not the fault. Maritain studied the great philosophers—Descartes, in particular—too long ever to doubt that disorders in the world begin in disorders in the mind, even in minds long before our era.

Maritain remains a guide to the heart of things for those who would suspect that the last word on modernity is not yet spoken in the public order. No doubt, Maritain expected after World War II that a return to sanity, to a consideration of the deepest spiritual roots of which we still do not adequately comprehend, might very well leave us open as much to a new form of modernity as to the traditional understanding of what is. The wars of the world remain the wars of the mind.

Deconstructionism, the latest academic candidate to invigorate modernity, is correctly seen to be not an admission that modernity was wrong but that it was not pushed far enough, that there is still hope that its principles will work [Royal]. Interestingly enough, the only thinker who seems to be in the same realist set of mind as Maritain was Leo Strauss [Asselin]. Even Alasdair MacIntyre is seen to be rather on the side
of an intellectual subjectivism which is not rooted directly in being but in a tradition of argument that need not be directly metaphysical in the Thomist sense that Maritain used it [Asselin].

What was the most unique of these essays--the discussions of Bernanos and Maritain--touched on an issue, perhaps the remnants of the long relation of Augustinianism and Thomism--namely, the relation of faith to the world [Bush]. Maritain always must be read in light of The Peasant of the Garonne, wherein, before he died, he saw some of the problems connected with religious enthusiasm over improving the world. Still, Maritain devoted his life to the proposition that faith made a difference in the world. Maritain's discussion of political authority reformulated the central thesis of Aristotle and St. Thomas about the need for authority [O'Donnell]. The answer to totalitarianism is not no authority, or even limited authority--but, rather, legitimate authority, which might, indeed, have to be strong and intelligent at the same time. Maritain's brief essay on ethics in a barbarian society in Man and the State remains necessary and sober reading for those who would either be overly naive about the goodness in the actual human heart or about the kinds of problems with which even valid authority has to deal. Bernanos was, however, worried about Maritain's emphasis on democracy. His worry, in spite of first impressions that only a French reactionary would question democracy, is worth considering. Bernanos, though a few years younger than Maritain seemed to be critical of Maritain's effort to capture for the faith modern ideas of democracy, which, in France in particular, had distinctly ideological roots. Maritain belonged to those many of our era who want to claim that the faith ought also to transform the political and economic order. Maritain did not, to be sure, claim either that the faith is about politics or that the Gospels contain a formula for economic success.

The position of Maritain on democracy might not be impossible in theory. Faith and reason are not contradictory. Indeed, faith ought to correct even political reason; but, in Bernanos's eyes, Maritain's thesis contained the danger of forgetting that most of the human beings--

including Christians—who ever lived did not live in democracies, and still do not—however modern states may be called. If the faith is about political order, then it is of little use for most men in most eras, including the France of history and of our own time. For the faith to concern itself so much with external, political forms, and to identify its success with their establishment, would leave most men without profound teaching about what it is for which they are ultimately to aim in this life. It is by no means clear that citizens of democracies save their souls at any faster rate than those of tyrannies. Bernanos and Solzhenitsyn, neither of whom praised tyrannies, would have had much in common in this regard. The essential question the Lord will ask at the Judgment will not be, "Did you work hard for democracy?"

Maritain, of course, was right to look for an alternative to what had, in fact, been produced by modern thought from Descartes, Machiavelli, and Bacon. Maritain was quite aware that the principal defensive strategy of Christianity was to establish that it was not intrinsically opposed to those aspects of modernity that had, in fact, improved the human lot. Maritain's American illusions, perhaps, were overly sanguine, but not because he did not see the American virtues correctly [Mancini]. Rather, he did not anticipate the direction of autonomous man in democratic societies themselves. The comparison of de Tocqueville with Maritain is always instructive in this regard. De Tocqueville worried about democratic tyrannies in a way Maritain, though aware of its possibilities through Rousseau, did not.

Why Maritain's *Reflections on America* remains central, however, is its emphasis on the practical, productive economy which does not have the capacity of materially improving the lot of most people—something Maritain felt was a legitimate heritage from Aristotle, from the Catholic tradition, and from the American experience. The curious phenomenon of liberation theology does not, I think, have roots in *Reflections on America*, but represents its exact antithesis, an antithesis supported even more strongly by *Man and the State*, with its careful distinction between the spheres of politics and religion, without denying the range of each. The European left never forgave the the author of *Integral Humanism* for

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9Jacques Maritain, *Integral Humanism: Temporal and Spiritual Problems*
writing Reflections on America. In a sense, even the social doctrine of the Church has not caught up with the basic issue which Maritain sensed in Reflections on America—namely, that the issue of poverty is not independent of the issue of productivity and its conditions. We have no option for the poor without understanding why people are not poor in the first place.

The relation of Strauss and Maritain is worthy of reflection. Man and the State and Natural Right and History were given in subsequent years at the University of Chicago in the early 1950s. Strauss did not see any possibility of revelation directing itself to reason. He could not exclude the possibility of revelation whose possibility he defended; but for him the highest vocation was that of philosopher. For Maritain the philosopher's vocation was also his, but it was this very vocation that excluded a closed humanism. Both Strauss and Maritain returned to the Greeks, but only Maritain returned also through those medievals who were not Averroists. Both understood modernity in the same way, and both recognized that the modern era contained aberrations of the deepest sort.

Strauss was less willing than Maritain to come to terms with what seemed to be the good in modernity. Strauss was, in a way, closer to Bernanos or Augustine in expecting that we would not find any good actual cities. Maritain, however, expected that the post war era would produce a better social order. In many ways it did; but there is a gnawing realization from the themes of The Twilight of Civilization, the condition of our education and the condition of our moral life, that the forms of democracy by themselves do not hold a sophisticated barbarism back [Hudson, Hancock, Boyle].

Both Strauss and Maritain sought to think through the status of the social sciences [Nelson]. Strauss was more unwilling to grant that the modern social sciences have redeeming value. He thought they were, in fact, essentially the causes of the problems of modernity. Maritain sought to rethink the whole nature of the sciences, not merely in their modern sense but also in their medieval and classical understandings. Maritain's


10Leo Strauss, Natural Right and History (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1953).
terminology was sometimes rather daunting, but he thought that it was possible to classify even Freud and make proper use of his efforts. Since science claimed to lie at the heart of modernity or an autonomous humanism, both Strauss and Maritain devoted long discussions to the intellectual validity of science, to its roots not in modernity but in the classics.

Just what Maritain would have made of Rifkin and environmentalism is a problem [Royal, Trapani]. I am inclined to think, with Royal, that environmentalism is the successor to socialism as the latest form of autonomous modernity. No doubt, the notion of harmony of work and nature was a heritage from the early Benedictines in Western civilization. Both Aristotle and Genesis had established the relation of man to nature. Civilization was, indeed, the addition of man and his work and art to nature. The belated fate of science and technology in modernity has been to pass from a sort of substitute for religion to a kind of cause of apocalypse.

The enemy of environmentalism is development. Already here we have a conflict between one side of modernity which wanted to make men happy through science and another side which saw man as only a function of nature, not its purpose and guide. The irrationalist side of humanism which Maritain saw in theories of race and nation have rather strong affinity with worrisome strands in environmentalism or ecology. The most recent candidate for the absolute state, for the good of man, of course, comes from this area, with the reabsorption into the species in order to keep on-going nature alive, as it is said.

Maritain concerned himself with the worldly condition. Bernanos, though he preferred classical French monarchy, was sure that we are called to save our souls in whatever society in which we find ourselves, good or bad. Maritain would not have denied this, of course; but Maritain was not a Platonist who thought that the city in speech was the best we could do. Maritain's grandfather was a Prime Minister in the Third Republic; so he was not likely to be a monarchist, even of the French kind. Maritain did think, however, that the city in speech, the best city possible, needed to be intellectually elaborated [Hellman]. He had the insight to propose its essential outlines, not just in speech, but in practice. Maritain's influence at UNESCO, and even at the Vatican, to which he was French Ambassador took his worldly duties seriously. Maritain's political writings, furthermore, are full of admonitions about human weakness, variety, and contrariety. He knew that practical things are
tenuous, but he considered it necessary and worthwhile to act where he could.

What is still the most dangerous failure of clarification in modern political and, especially, ecclesiastical thought is the intellectual status of human rights. To his credit Maritain tried to save the notion of rights from their undoubted modernist origins. Strauss was much more blunt here. It could not be done, Strauss thought. Modern natural, or human, rights, the kind we hear and speak of, are anti-human. In modern theory, they mean nothing more or nothing less than that autonomous will stands at their origin producing their content. Maritain's treatments of natural rights can be defended as coming from a different tradition, the Thomist natural law position, though one stemming, as Strauss's, from Plato and Aristotle.

Maritain could metaphysically ground natural rights as he did in Man and the State and The Rights of Man and the Natural Law. He could propose that moderns practically accept these rights without necessarily having the same intellectual justifications found in the work of Hobbes or Locke. Though I would accept the originality of Maritain's solution, I have always been leery of this hope of Maritain. In Strauss's terms, when we hear the word "human rights," we almost invariably hear modern natural rights, which have no root but will. However judiciously it is used, I do not think that the term "natural rights" can be saved from its subjective origins in Hobbes, Locke, and Rousseau. We should do with it as Maritain himself did with the word "sovereignty"—that is, simply not use it since it can only cause confusion and harm.

Nothing is more confounding and nothing serves to introduce the next ideological stages of modernity into contemporary society, which these essays seek to trace, than Human Rights based in will alone. What Professor Raymond Dennehy rightly called "the ontological status of human rights" remains impossible in a will theory of rights. With rights now being claimed for everything from trees to tree owls, from abortions to any conceivable sort of life-style, this concept of human rights serves to promote exactly what classic natural law was designed to limit or prevent in the end, such rights are no longer natural rights. They are only civil rights to be determined by the state's will presupposed to nothing but its

own will. Even constitutions are reinterpreted in this light.

The place of work, and its relation to civilization, was long a topic of interest to Maritain and his esteemed student Yves R. Simon [Doering]. In a yet unresolved comparison with Josef Pieper's study of leisure, the place of work in civilization is a controverted one. Pieper was most reluctant to call the activities of contemplation also work, as modern popes have tended to do. No doubt, under the influence of Christianity, the status of all work has been enhanced, if looked upon, particularly, from the standpoint of the worker. The Greeks distinguished rather on the basis of the object of activity and hierarchized their analysis accordingly. There were things done for their own sakes and things done simply for use. The Greeks did not think a man a slave because of his legal or political status, but because of the sort of work he did. The link between slavery and technology is already in Aristotle, who said that if machines could replace certain works of drudgery we would not need slaves. When this replacement came about through modern technology, in particular, there was a certain widespread confusion about the value of work.

In reading Genesis Christians have seen "working by the sweat of their brows" to be a sort of penance, something caused by The Fall. Aristotle had distinguished between artistic and slave work. The crafts did something very human. They made necessary tools and could make them and their products beautiful in their own ways. Christianity, in looking to the worker, with St. Joseph as the paradigm, has tended to pay less attention to the divisions within the world of work to which Pieper was attuned. Whether Maritain (and Weil and Simon) would have been so unhappy with America on the grounds of work conditions [Doering] might be questioned.

No revolution seems more in line with the sort of freeing tool to the mind and workplace as the personal computer which makes possible work in the home as the kind of entrepreneurship that makes such power available on a wide scale. Analyses of causes of economic growth in recent years have shown that small and medium sized companies are the main sources for the new products and methods in the economy. Moreover, the size of the economy is itself a product of the freeing on a more worldwide scale of individual sources of ideas and institutions. If the only real wealth in the world is the human brain, there are many positive things that would, I think, have pleased Maritain and Simon about the conditions and nature of work.

Maritain's capacity for friendship has been often noted. We have
several discussions of the power of his personal interest and character
[Suther, Dunaway]. I have remarked that the wars of the world take place
first in wars in the mind, but wars in the mind can be genteel and friendly.
Professor Suther's reflection is worth emphasis in this regard:

So if the example has any validity, perhaps the spirit of pluralism can survive in the most contentious of climates. Perhaps the clamor of -isms that raged in France between the two world wars is not the only echo that will be heard in another fifty years. The polarizing language of dogmatism and belief that became a fashionable vernacular of those times may not constitute the sole surviving script as the record is read and reread and revised. Without ascribing a false heroism to Jacques Maritain, I do think he contributed some indelible lines to an alternative script of his times.

Maritain's relationships with a Cocteau, with a Bernanos, with a Gide, and others was friendly and intelligent. The point is not so much that it is good for pluralisms to continue to exist, for this is itself merely a modernist ideology, but for truth to be engaged in a fashion that does not destroy the city while, at the same time, really coming to grips with serious issues of human being and the nature of what is. The very purpose of the human mind is to make dogmas, as Chesterton said. Maritain knew that truth was found in the judgment, and the purpose of our powers of judgment was exactly to judge, to conclude to what is true. Near the end of The Twilight of Civilization, Maritain remarked:

If it is correct to say that there will always be rightist temperaments and leftist temperaments, it is nonetheless also correct to say that political philosophy is neither rightist nor leftist; it must simply be true.12

Civilization does not exist for the sake of pluralism. Pluralism exists because there are many ways to do practical things and to arrange civil orders. Pluralism also exists because it takes time and effort to come judgment about what is right and wrong. Pluralism, however, does not exist for its own sake, as if there were no judgments to be made. Ultimately, pluralism exists for the truth. At some basic level, philosophers must engage in the sober and difficult enterprise of seeking the

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12Jacques Maritain, The Twilight of Civilization, 57.
truth itself, not merely seeking it, but finding it. Maritain would be the first to admit that this cannot be done without humility, but he would also recognize that the skeptical thesis, that pluralism exists because no truth is possible, is itself the primary cause of the moral failure of modern society.

"The Christian religion is annexed to no temporal regime: it is compatible with all forms of legitimate government." If the Christian religion is annexed to no temporal regime, it must mean that the sources of what it is to be a temporal regime are derived not from religion but from philosophy and the experience of living; but Maritain's whole essay was written in a period when it was clear that some temporal regimes claimed more than temporal authority. Why they did this was itself the philosophical problem addressed in The Twilight of Civilization. Some forms of government, in other words, were not legitimate. The spelling out of why this was so was one of Maritain's abiding contributions. Maritain was quite aware of what he once called them, of "the things that were not Caesar's." In these papers the writers have reflected both the Maritain dealing with political modernity and with the Maritain dealing with those things which transcend politics. Maritain remains one of the few philosophers of this century in whom justice is done to both of these aspects of reality—to the world and to what transcends the world.

If we are to sum up the essential problem that Maritain had with an atheist humanism, or with modernity that might continue even after the apparent demise of socialism, we can do no better than to cite Professor Redpath's accurate observation:

Modern philosophy...is not an age in which practical science dominates over theoretical science. Rather, it is an age in which unbridled artistic creativity (creativity based upon uprooted, realistically blind, and subjective inspiration) is the measure of all truths—those of practical and theoretical science included.

It is no accident that artistic creativity, itself a subject of so much insightful analysis in Maritain, assumes the central role. If man is already a certain kind of natural reality, with his own being and intelligibility, as

13Ibid., 60.
Aristotle maintained, then the relation of civilization to him is not to be based on *artistic creativity*—which is, at bottom, the claim of modern natural rights—but of prudence itself rooted in a metaphysics open to revelation.

Speaking of the German philosopher Carl Schmitt, Maritain wrote that Schmitt's famous distinction about friend and foe being the essence of politics was not the essence of politics itself, but it was the essence of *pagan* politics; and the study of pagan politics revealed to us "...what a terrible reality is the political divorced from the eternal law and from the vivifying energies of Christ, the political as the spirit of the world puts it into practice—and with what delight, what ferocity!"¹⁴ Political philosophy is to be *true*, as Maritain maintained—true not just to itself, to what it is open to, but also to its record and its causes.

The intellectual concerns that Maritain articulated in *The Twilight of Civilization* bear much affinity with the historical development we have seen since he spoke in Paris in 1939. What is surprising, however, in following the evolution of autonomous humanism, is how often Maritain's concern remains at the heart of civilization in whose twilight he brooded [Gallagher]. It is not the dawn until the intellectual core of modern thought is based not on will but on *what is*, a what is that is by its own nature open also to receive what it could not have anticipated. Why the work of Jacques Maritain remains worth deep study, as these essays show, is because he is one of the few guides to take both the order of the world and the City of God seriously enough to discover their mutual affinity with each other.