

YVES R. SIMON AND AQUINAS ON WILLING THE COMMON GOOD

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In treating the goodness and evil of the interior act of the will, Aquinas makes the following remarkable assertion:

But a man's will is not right in willing a particular good, unless he refer it to the common good as an end: since even the natural appetite of each part is ordained to the common good of the whole. Now it is the end that supplies the formal reason, as it were, of willing whatever is directed to the end. Consequently, in order that a man will some particular good with a right will, he must will that particular good materially, and the Divine and universal good, formally.¹

At issue in this quotation is an essential piece, perhaps indeed the central piece, of Aquinas's understanding of the goodness of human willing and action. Goodness of the human will is from the end willed.² And within the hierarchy of ends willed, the willing of higher ends is formal with regards to the willing of lower ends. Thus, the foundational proper ordination in the human will is that it will the true ultimate end. In the above text, as in many other texts, Aquinas identifies the ultimate end as the common good.³ Willing the common good, it seems

¹ Thomas Aquinas, *Summa Theologiae* (hereafter cited as *ST*), I-II, q. 19, a. 10, translation of the Fathers of the English Dominican Province (New York: Benziger Brothers, 1947). Of this article, Yves Simon comments: "It is fitting to quote in its entirety the body of this article, in which few seem to have recognized the most precise exposition ever made of the principles commanding the theory of government," *Philosophy of Democratic Government* (Notre Dame, Indiana: University of Notre Dame Press, 1993), p. 40. (This work is cited hereafter as *DG*.)

² Thomas Aquinas, *ST* I-II, q. 1, aa. 4 and 6. The emphasis of goodness as from the end willed (*finis operantis*) does not of course preclude goodness from the object of the action itself (*finis operis*), since goodness is *ex integra causa* (*ST* I-II, q. 18, a. 4, ad. 3).

³ Another key text is Thomas Aquinas, *ST* I-II, q. 90, a. 2.

to me, especially given its foundational place in Aquinas's ethics and moral theology, receives surprisingly little attention.⁴

The political treatises of Yves Simon are an exception. An astute student of Aquinas's political philosophy, and especially of the notion of authority, Simon is acutely aware of the central role of willing the common good. Both those in authority and those acting as individuals within a community should will and intend the common good. Indeed, in both cases, such willing is at the foundation of moral rectitude. The goal of this paper is to shed some light on how an individual person (i.e., a person not acting in the office of authority) should will the common good. An individual's proper willing of the common good includes that he or she: 1) will the common good most of all, 2) be obedient to authority, and 3) will all else on account of the common good. These points should become clear through an examination of Simon's work, especially his treatment of the role of authority in society.

Before turning to Simon, let us note a few points I will take for granted. The common good is a good proper to a community of persons.⁵ A community exercises a collective causality—a causality that belongs to it as a whole (even when only a few members actually

⁴ That the obviously *political* notion of willing the common good has such a central position in Aquinas's ethics should come as no surprise. For Aquinas, politics is the highest part of moral science. See Aquinas, *Commentary on Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics*, Bk 1, lect. 1, #4-6 on the parts of moral science, and Aquinas, *Commentary on Aristotle's Politics (Sententia libri politicorum)*, trans. R. Regan (Indianapolis, Indiana: Hackett, 2007), Prologue, on the primacy of politics: "Therefore, if a superior science concerns what is more excellent and complete, politics is necessarily superior and architectonic to all other practical sciences, since politics considers the ultimate end and complete good regarding human affairs" (pp. 2-3).

⁵ On the different senses of the term "common good," see Gregory Froelich, "The Equivocal Status of Bonum Commune," *The New Scholasticism* (Winter 1989): 38-57. The common good of a community of persons is "common" not as a genus or species, but as a "common final cause, according as the common good is said to be the common end" (*ST I-II*, q. 90, a. 2, ad. 2).

perform the action),⁶ and it has what we call common actions.⁷ A mere partnership, as distinguished from a community, has perhaps a “common interest,” yet this is nothing more than “a sum of private interests that happen to be interdependent.”⁸ The common good that we will consider is the common good of a “perfect” or complete society. There is of course a sense in which we can speak of there being a genuine “common good” of smaller communities—notably the family. But as the imperfect is a part of, and for the sake of, the perfect,⁹ it is fitting to focus on the complete society, as it is the complete society that has a common good in the more proper sense, as being the more ultimate end. Now, the heavenly city, too, is a complete society, the end of which is the most ultimate common good.¹⁰ But, for this examination of willing the common good, I will focus on willing the common good of the political society, as my concern is to emphasize the general structure of willing the common good.¹¹

To begin our consideration of Simon’s account of how to will the common good, we must begin with the distinction between what he calls the form and the matter of the common good. He introduces this

⁶ Yves R. Simon, *DG* 64.

⁷ Yves R. Simon, *A General Theory of Authority* (Notre Dame, Indiana: University of Notre Dame Press, 1980), p. 30—cited hereafter as *GT*—and Yves R. Simon, *DG* 64-65.

⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 30.

⁹ See Thomas Aquinas, *ST* I-II, q. 90, a. 2, and *Commentary on Aristotle’s Politics*, lib. 1.1 n. 30 (Bk I, chapter 1, #22, p. 17 in R. Regan’s translation).

¹⁰ Thomas Aquinas, *De caritate* 2. Here, Aquinas employs properly political notions to expound his understanding of charity as a virtue. Charity itself is the love of God as the common good of the heavenly Jerusalem.

¹¹ I realize that the relation between willing the common good of the civil society and willing the most ultimate supernatural common good is of concrete and critical importance in the moral life. The key to this issue, as to many of the most difficult moral issues in the thought of Aquinas, is in the teleological principle that the lower serves and receives its meaning from the higher, to which it is ordered. I address this briefly at the end of this essay.

distinction by pointing to “an opposition between form and content within the object of volition and intention.”¹² He states: “I may will and intend what is good without knowing *what the thing is* that is good.”¹³ He proceeds to explain that a man of good will is daily faced with the problem of determining just what it is “in which the form of goodness resides.” Simon then applies these terms to the common good and speaks of the form of the common good and the matter of the common good as two distinguishable objects of volition. In other words, it is one thing to will the “good” of the community, and it is another thing to will that complex order of goods that actually constitutes the good of the community.¹⁴

Having asserted a distinction between the form and matter of the common good, Simon is prepared to distinguish between the role of authority and that of the private individual. He says:

So far as community life is concerned, the problem of matter and form within the end can be posed as follows: Is it desirable that the common good be willed and intended, both with regard to matter and with regard to form, by private persons acting in a private capacity?¹⁵

It is particularly in answering this rich question that Simon teaches us much about the common good and how to will it. Here is a tripartite outline of his answer. First, it is evident in the scholastic tradition, and particularly in Aquinas, that any good person must will the form of the common good. Second, an individual person, acting in his private capacity

¹² Yves R. Simon, *GT* 52.

¹³ *Ibid.*; emphasis original.

¹⁴ It seems to me that what Simon is expressing can also be captured by using a distinction that Aquinas makes as regards the willing of happiness: willing the *ratio* versus willing *that in which the ratio is found*. To answer the question whether all humans will the same final end, Aquinas distinguishes between the *ratio* of beatitude, and that in which beatitude is found. All humans agree in desiring the former, since all “desire the fulfillment of their perfection,” but not the latter, since different people seek their fulfillment in different things (*ST* I-II, q. 1, a. 7).

¹⁵ Yves R. Simon, *GT* 52-53.

as a member of the society, should *not* will and intend the matter of the common good. Third, it is the role of authority, indeed its “most essential function,”¹⁶ to will and in some sense determine the matter of the common good. Let us look at each of the three points of this answer.

The first point, that a good person must will the common good formally, Simon sees as uncontroversial. To will the common good formally is to will the common flourishing, the good that is proper to the whole society, and to will it above one’s private good. Simon explains:

The private person, inasmuch as he is morally excellent, wills and intends the common good, and subordinates his private wishes to it. He may not know what action the common good demands, but he adheres to the common good formally understood, to the form of the common good, whatever may be the matter in which this form resides....¹⁷

While Aquinas holds that all persons necessarily agree in intending the *ratio* of beatitude,¹⁸ the fulfillment of perfection, he does not hold that all persons necessarily *intend* the common good, even just in its form or *ratio*. He does hold that there is a natural inclination or a natural love of common goods above the private good of the self;¹⁹ but, as we all know, natural inclinations are not necessarily acted out. Virtue is required in order to live out this natural inclination. Indeed, we can even say that the refusal actually to love the common good more than self is one of the main ways, if not the primary way, to distinguish a bad person from a good person. Simon remarks on the sad condition of society:

In societies such as the cities and states of our experience, where selfishness and ignorance prevail, persons have to be constantly directed and often coerced toward the common good.

¹⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 57, and DG 59.

¹⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 55.

¹⁸ See Thomas Aquinas, *ST I-II*, q. 1, a.7, ad. 1, where Aquinas explains that even in sinning a person does not turn away from “the intention of the last end.”

¹⁹ See Thomas Aquinas, *ST I*, q. 60, a. 5c and ad. 5.

Men of ill will seek their own advantage and ignore the good of all....²⁰

Certainly, Simon does us a great service in bringing before us a bedrock truth of our tradition that can often seem to have been forgotten: a good person, by definition, is one who intends the common good above his or her private good.

The second point in his answer to the above question is that an individual person, acting in a private capacity as a member of society, should *not* will and intend the matter of the common good. Simon begins by arguing the other side: the virtuous person, if truly virtuous, wills the form and matter of the common good. Now, since virtue guarantees that a person wills the form of the common good, should it not also guarantee that he or she wills the matter of the common good? Simon comments: "It almost irresistibly seems that a disposition concerned with the form of the common good but not with its matter is just about half a virtue."²¹

In order to refute this position, Simon notes that we must distinguish between two capacities in society. Often referred to as "public" and "private" capacities, Simon prefers to call them "common" and "particular." These capacities must not be confounded, for the primary reason that *they are both necessary for the common good*. Now the common capacity "is defined by a relation to the common good considered not only in its form but also in its matter or content."²² The particular capacity, on the other hand, does not have such a relation to the matter of the common good; if it did, it would cease to be a particular capacity. Thus, since the common good itself requires both capacities to be exercised, it is important that the particular capacity not be compromised by a direct relation to the matter of the common one.

An analogy from the military life is in order. In war, a commanding officer is ordered to hold a certain position at all costs. The officer, as a

²⁰ Yves R. Simon, *GT* 51.

²¹ *Ibid.*, p. 58.

²² *Ibid.*, p. 57.

good soldier, intends the common good of the army and of the nation, which right now means victory in war. But he has a particular capacity in this effort, namely, the holding of this position. He intends to hold this position, precisely because he intends victory in war. Simon aptly states: "Thus the particular good—holding the place—is willed because of the common good, on the ground of the common good, under a determination supplied by the common good."²³ Now, the next point is as important as it is obvious: the officer must concern himself with the particular good and not with the question of overall strategy. Were he to concern himself with overall strategy, it would be prejudicial both to his maintaining the position and to the overall strategy itself, or in other words, the material common good of the army.

The point of this analogy is clear. The common good demands that particular goods be given "particular" attention. The formal willing of the common good by a virtuous person requires that he or she attend to his or her own particular capacity,²⁴ and not to the content itself of the common good. This very point is made even more dramatically when Aquinas argues that the wife of the condemned man should will that his life be spared. In other words, her will that he be spared is precisely what her formal willing of the common good demands, even though the material common good requires that he be executed.²⁵

Now Simon's third point: authority's "most essential function" is to will and in some sense determine the matter of the common good. This is at the heart of Simon's understanding of authority. One of the great

²³ Yves R. Simon, *DG* 43.

²⁴ Simon distinguishes two kinds of particularity: particularity in subject, and particularity in function. He explains the distinction at *DG* 55-57 and *GT* 60-61. Particularity in subject is the particularity that belongs to a "part" of society as such, the best examples being an individual person, or a family. Particularity in function is the particularity of what is concerned with a certain aspect of a whole, as for instance the army is concerned with the security of the whole nation. "Autonomy" is an excellence that especially attaches to particularity in subject (*GT* 64). The advantage of specialization is an excellence that attaches to particularity in function (*GT* 62).

²⁵ See Thomas Aquinas, *ST* I-II, q. 19, a. 10, and Yves R. Simon, *DG* 42.

contributions of Simon's treatment of authority is the masterful way he shows that the function of authority is not merely "substitutional;" in other words, its role in human affairs is not ultimately grounded in the defects—intellectual, moral, or other—of human persons. What he calls the paternal function of authority is substitutional; it is rooted in the temporary incapacity of those subject to it and it aims at its own disappearance.²⁶ What he calls the "essential function" of authority is its causation of "united action" when the means to the common good are not uniquely determined.²⁷ But he reserves the phrase "most essential function" to that before us now: its role in the intention of the common good. He defends his use of the phrase "most essential" by noting that this function of authority "concerns the most fundamental act of social life"—the intention of the common good.²⁸

So how does Simon describe the relation between authority and the intention of the common good? Authority intends, in addition to the form, the matter or content of the common good. The argument that authority intends the matter of the common good is very simple. Simon takes it as evident that there must be some principle that intends the matter of the common good. He states:

It is obvious that the common good has to be intended not only formally but also materially; if it is established that it should not be intended materially by particular persons, it follows that a nonparticular reason and will ought to be constituted; otherwise the common good, materially considered, would not be intended at all.²⁹

²⁶ Yves R. Simon, *DG* 15.

²⁷ See Yves R. Simon *GT* 41-50, where he argues that this role for authority is not rooted in the imperfection of those under the authority. See, especially, *GT* 49: "Given a community on its way to its common good, and given, on the part of this community, the degree of excellence which entails the possibility of attaining the good in a diversity of ways, authority has an indispensable role to play, and this role originates entirely in plenitude and accomplishment."

²⁸ Yves R. Simon, *DG* 59.

²⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 56.

Simon is convinced that the common good of society simply requires that authority order the parts in view of the common flourishing. This implies that authority must make determinations³⁰ regarding just what constitutes the common good. These determinations are expressed, among other ways, in law.³¹ The significance of this point in Simon's view becomes clear in the final paragraph of his masterful chapter "General Theory of Government" in *Philosophy of Democratic Government*:

Finally, let us again call attention to the illusion that the good will of each, if it were complete and enlightened, would suffice to guarantee the intention of the common good. This illusion is stubborn because it is hard to master the operation of the principles which, at the bottom of the question, seem to conflict but actually condition and supplement each other. The common good demands that particular persons should do full justice to the goodness of the particular good; but, if such is the case, an over-all direction toward the common good is necessary.³²

We have completed, then, Simon's tripartite answer to his own question of whether it is desirable that private persons will the common good both with regard to matter and to form. The first point of my thesis has been directly treated: an individual's proper willing of the common good implies willing the form of the common good, and this above one's own private good. The second point, too, can now readily be clarified: right willing of the common good requires obedience to authority, which determines the matter of the common good. We can put it this way: for the individual to have the right relation to the common good, it is not sufficient that he or she will the common good formally, and his or her particular good materially.³³ The "something more" that is needed is precisely obedience to authority, and acceptance of its direction concerning the matter of the common good. Simon explains:

³⁰ Yves R. Simon, *GT* 146.

³¹ *Ibid.*, p. 55.

³² *Ibid.*, pp. 70-71.

³³ *Ibid.*, pp. 144-45.

But what relation will obtain between those in charge of the common good and those whose duty it is to intend, in a material sense, particular goods? Clearly, the very principle of the primacy of the common good demands that the intentions of the latter be subordinated to the intentions of the former. The primacy of the common good demands that those in charge of particular goods should obey those in charge of the common good. It is, in the last analysis, as simple as that.³⁴

Here, we gain insight into the beautiful and indispensable virtue of obedience. In obedience, a person's actions and pursuits are given form and direction by the concrete demands of the common good, as determined by authority. And the disposition to obey authority is a necessary expression of the person's willing of the common good, just as surely as the dictates of authority are an expression of the authority's willing of the common good.

Authority's determination of the matter of the common good provides the context for a person's pursuit of good in the private capacity. Simon does not envision the role of authority as simply providing certain boundaries to the private capacity—as though the high command simply arranged things so that subordinate officers might pursue their own affairs. Since the private capacity is itself for the sake of the common good, its very structure is essentially conditioned and determined by the common good itself. Simon refers to this point when he says of the officer, "Thus the particular good—holding the place—is willed because of the common good, on the ground of the common good, *under a determination supplied by the common good.*"³⁵ That the private capacity receives an essential determination from the matter of the common good does not compromise the private-ness of this capacity. Rather, it preserves its place in serving the common good.

Is there an antimony, then, in holding that a person should not will the matter of the common good, but that he or she should be directed

³⁴ Yves R. Simon, *DG* 56-57.

³⁵ *Ibid*, p. 43; emphasis added.

by authority's determination of the matter of the common good? There is not. The good person wills the form of the common good, and thus pursues his or her particular capacity precisely within that intention. Simon explains that it is thanks to authority that "the man of good will who wants to do the thing that the common good demands actually knows what that thing is and does it."³⁶ In other words, the particular capacity itself takes shape in the context of some understanding of the matter of the common good, as determined by authority. Here, the particular capacity is most itself—as integrated into the complex order of goods that constitutes the common flourishing of the community.³⁷

We would do well to recall the reason why Simon holds that an individual person should not will the matter of the common good. The reason is *not* that the common good will simply "happen" when each person wills and acts for his particular good. Rather, the common good itself requires the excellence of the particular capacities, which excellence requires the particular attention of individuals.³⁸ And such particular attention can only be properly given by individuals who do not seek to determine the matter of the common good themselves, but who are obedient to the determinations of authority. In sum, the common good is best achieved if individuals will the common good most of all, and thus obediently receive direction in the exercise of their private capacities.

The third and final point of my thesis regarding how to will the common good—that one should will all else on account of the common good—hearkens back to the opening quotation of this paper:

³⁶ Yves R. Simon, *GT* 145.

³⁷ Given the role of authority, it goes without saying that any significant failure in its determining the matter of the common good has serious repercussions, both for the common good itself and the individuals who will it. We can consider Simon's sober words: "When the private person has to emerge above his capacity and substitute for nonexistent public persons, an awe-inspiring solitude makes him realize that the structure of society has broken down" (*DG* 44).

³⁸ See Yves R. Simon, *GT* 64-65.

But a man's will is not right in willing a particular good, unless he refer it to the common good as an end: since even the natural appetite of each part is ordained to the common good of the whole. Now it is the end that supplies the formal reason, as it were, of willing whatever is directed to the end. Consequently, in order that a man will some particular good with a right will, he must will that particular good materially, and the Divine and universal good, formally.³⁹

It seems to me that here we have the most significant and challenging aspect of the proper willing of the common good. It is not enough that the common good be willed as higher than other goods; the common good should also be the reason for willing other goods: i.e., the goods that are ordered to it.⁴⁰ This point is of course closely connected to our last considerations above. If a person wills particular goods precisely because he or she wills the common good, he or she will have every reason to be attentive to the material determinations of authority.

As I noted earlier, my point in this paper is to address the universal structure of how to will the common good, without giving special attention to the issue of different levels of common good. In the above quotation, Aquinas is speaking of the ultimate common good: the divine good itself. The central point, that the end supplies the formal reason of willing whatever is directed to the end, is a fundamental teleological principle that first of all obtains and is observable in the natural, political realm. For Aquinas, the common good of the civil

³⁹ Thomas Aquinas, *ST I-II*, q. 19, a. 10.

⁴⁰ We might consider again the words of Simon regarding the military officer: "Thus the particular good—holding the place—is willed *because of the common good*, on the ground of the common good, under a determination supplied by the common good" (*DG* 43); emphasis added.

society is the highest end of human action in the natural order,⁴¹ and as such it supplies the formal reason for willing other human goods.⁴²

This point is especially highlighted in Aquinas's understanding of what he calls general or legal justice. General justice is a virtue that "directs man to the common good," by referring the acts of other virtues to the common good.⁴³ In a striking article, Aquinas says that this virtue is a "general virtue" not by predication, but rather "virtually," as "a universal cause is general in relation to all its effects." He proceeds to explain:

Now it is in the latter sense that, according to what has been said, legal justice is said to be a general virtue, in as much, to wit, as it directs the acts of the other virtues to its own end, and this is to move all the other virtues by its command; for just as charity may be called a general virtue in so far as it directs the acts of all the virtues to the Divine good, so too is legal justice, in so far as it directs the acts of all the virtues to the common good.⁴⁴

The comparison to charity is of particular significance; general justice is the natural analogate for charity. Now, for Aquinas, since charity is what orders one to the ultimate, supernatural end, and things ordered to the end are "not said to be good except in relation to the end," no "true virtue" is possible without charity.⁴⁵ He thus also asserts:

Now it is evident, in accordance with what has been said (a.7), that it is charity which directs the acts of all other virtues to the last end, and which, consequently, also gives the form to all

⁴¹ See Thomas Aquinas, *Commentary on Aristotle's Politics*, Prologue: "...since politics considers the ultimate and complete good regarding human affairs" (paragraph 7 in the Latin; Regan, pp. 2-3).

⁴² See Yves R. Simon, *The Tradition of Natural Law* (New York: Fordham University Press, 1992), p. 105: "The end of the moral virtues resides in the common good of the temporal society." (This work is cited hereafter as *TNL*.)

⁴³ Thomas Aquinas, *ST II-II*, q. 58, a. 5.

⁴⁴ *Ibid.*, a. 6.

⁴⁵ Thomas Aquinas, *ST II-II*, q. 23, a. 7.

other acts of virtue: and it is precisely in this sense that charity is called the form of the virtues....⁴⁶

Aquinas's treatment of general justice as a natural analogate for charity highlights our third point about willing the common good: willing the common good, which is the ultimate end, either in the natural or supernatural order, provides the reason and thus gives form to the willing of more particular goods. This is why general justice, the virtue of willing the (natural) common good and referring other goods to it, is called both the highest of all moral virtues,⁴⁷ and the cause of all other moral virtues.⁴⁸

Given that the common good should provide the reason for willing the goods that are subordinate to it, it is important that we advert to the apparent problem of having more than one common good as a "final end." With characteristic clarity, Simon comments, "Let it also be remarked that an end may be final in a genuine sense and yet be contained within an order which is not, itself, final."⁴⁹ Aquinas directly addresses the issue of the two ends when he addresses whether there can be any true virtue without charity. If virtue be directed to a "particular good," such as the welfare of the state, while not further directed to the supernatural end by charity, it is true virtue, albeit imperfect.⁵⁰ Thus, even the common good of the civil society is a "particular good" in relation to the ultimate, supernatural common good. There is no contradiction or disorder but rather harmony and perfect order in the moral agent who wills goods according to their place in the teleological hierarchy. That a person wills particular natural goods both for the sake of the common good of society, and then also more deeply for the sake of the divine common good, is a reality that is perhaps only fully understood by those who do it.

⁴⁶ *Ibid.*, a. 8.

⁴⁷ *Ibid.*, a. 12.

⁴⁸ *Ibid.*, a. 6.

⁴⁹ Yves R. Simon, *TNL* 100.

⁵⁰ Thomas Aquinas, *ST II-II*, q. 23, a. 7.

In conclusion, Simon has done us a great service in helping us to understand how to will the common good. The metaphysical relation of the common good to the particular goods that come under it is the reality to which the rightly ordered human will responds. Thus, the end "supplies the formal reason, as it were, of willing whatever is directed to the end,"⁵¹ precisely because "the end is the rule of whatever is ordained to the end."⁵² The good human will wills the common good, the final end, most of all, and so it wills particular goods as conditioned by the direction of authority regarding the matter of the common good. It seems that this understanding of willing of the common good grounds Aquinas's judgment regarding the hierarchy of virtues. Among the moral virtues, which are lower than the theological and intellectual virtues, Aquinas puts justice first.⁵³ If we look within the priority of justice, we find that more specifically he puts legal justice first, since it concerns the common good.⁵⁴ At the same time, he does not hesitate to say that obedience, a part of justice,⁵⁵ "whereby we condemn our own will for God's sake, is more praiseworthy than the other moral virtues...."⁵⁶

⁵¹ Thomas Aquinas, I-II, q. 19, a. 10.

⁵² Thomas Aquinas, *ST* I-II, Prologue: "ex fine enim oportet accipere rationes eorum quae ordinantur ad finem."

⁵³ Thomas Aquinas, *ST* I-II, q. 66, a.4.

⁵⁴ Thomas Aquinas, *ST* II-II, q. 58, a. 12. See, also, *ST* II-II, q. 161, a. 5, where he asks whether humility is the greatest: "Therefore after the theological virtues, after the intellectual virtues which regard reason itself, and after justice, especially legal justice, humility stands before all others."

⁵⁵ Thomas Aquinas, *ST* II-II, q. 104, a.2, ad. 2.

⁵⁶ *Ibid.*, a. 3.