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**Part VII**  
**A New Dawn:**  
**Transfiguring Integration**

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# Maritain and Happiness in Modern Thomism

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In the context of the thirteenth century, Aquinas's concern for earthly happiness--the *imperfect* version of the perfect beatitude bestowed by the vision of God--is unusual. Taken at face value, the account itself is not remarkable. The reference to *beatitudo imperfecta* in the five questions on happiness introducing the *Prima secundae* largely reiterates Aristotle on the possession of internal goods, external goods, and the goods of fortune in support of a life devoted to contemplation; but that St. Thomas provides any account at all is surprising, given the longstanding Augustinian suspicion of any claim to happiness on earth. This attention to human happiness *in via*, piecemeal as it is, places Aquinas closer to the brink of modernity than most of his medieval contemporaries and predecessors.<sup>1</sup>

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<sup>1</sup>For the Augustinian tensions underlying Aquinas's politics, see Thomas Gilby, *The Political Thought of Thomas Aquinas* (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1958), 237-64, and his *Between Community and Society: A Philosophy and Theology of the State* (New York: Longmans, Green and Co., 1953), 124-48. The context of medieval views of happiness is discussed by George Weiland in "Happiness: The Perfection of Man," *The Cambridge History of Later Medieval Philosophy*, eds. Norman Kretzmann, Anthony Kenny, and Jan Pinborg (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1982), 673-86. A recent treatment of the controversy over natural beatitude prompted by Henri de Lubac's *Surnaturel* (1946) is found in Kevin Staley, "Happiness: The Natural End of Man?," *The Thomist* 53 (April, 1989): 215-34.

St. Thomas did not envisage that the happiness he helped to resurrect would take on a finality of its own, eventually evolving into the immanent and psychological conception first found in Hobbes and the later ideologues who employed it for the political ends. It has been left to later Thomists to provide a coherent and persuasive account of imperfect happiness to a society that no longer waits upon eternity for perfection. Obviously such projects are necessary if modern Thomism can make good on its claim as a *perennial philosophy*. The idea of happiness has no doubt fallen on hard times; however, in becoming the favorite come-on in the commerce of self-help, happiness continues to provide evidence of its force in our thoughts and our language to *recommend a way of life*.<sup>2</sup> As the *Prima secundae* itself demonstrates, the obstacle confronting any serious investigation of happiness is one of scope. A comprehensive study of happiness will encompass the foundations of morality and politics, the constitution and destiny of the human person, as well as the ordinate relation of all human goods. Nonetheless, there are signs of a renewed attention to happiness, but from philosophers outside the Thomistic tradition.<sup>3</sup>

This was not true a generation ago. Among twentieth-century Thomists, Gilson, Simon, Pieper, and Maritain made significant attempts to wrestle with the issues arising from the contemporary concern for earthly happiness. Central to their reflections were these two questions: 1) How are the *two happinesses* related so as to respect the integrity of earthly happiness and the ultimate finality of eternal happiness? 2) How

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<sup>2</sup>This point, along with a general critique of happiness in the present age, is explored in my essay, "Can Happiness Be Saved?" in *Jacques Maritain: The Man and His Metaphysics*, ed. John F.X. Knasas (Notre Dame: American Maritain Association, 1988), 257-63.

<sup>3</sup>Elizabeth Telfer, *Happiness* (New York: St. Martins Press, 1980); Richard Warner, *Freedom, Enjoyment, and Happiness: An Essay on Moral Psychology* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1987); James Griffin, *Well-Being: Its Meaning, Measurement, and Moral Importance* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1986); and, notable for its defense of *eudaimonism*, John Kekes, *Moral Tradition and Individuality* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1989). For an argument along Thomistic lines for the importance of identifying God as the object of happiness see Stephen Theron, "Happiness and Transcendent Happiness," *Religious Studies* 21 (Spring 1985): 349-67.

adequate is Aquinas's Aristotelian picture of imperfect happiness, particularly in reference to his intellectualist emphasis upon the virtue of contemplation? In other words, how is it possible to conceive of two happinesses without logical contradiction and without sacrificing one to the other; and do the resources of the *Nichomachean Ethics* as employed by St. Thomas remain suitable to our conception of earthly happiness? Their answers, as shall be seen, are remarkably diverse.

### I.

Etienne Gilson offers the most conventional account of happiness among these Thomists. His interpretation of St. Thomas never deviates from a straightforward insistence on the primacy of contemplation in reaching toward God. More interesting is his explanation of how St. Thomas's teaching on beatitude was rejected by Dante only a generation after his death. Although the affinities between Dante's epic poem and the *Summa theologiae* are often explored, Gilson claims that Dante's view of happiness posed "one of the gravest dangers that have ever threatened" Thomism.<sup>4</sup> Basing his argument on Dante's philosophical works, *De monarchia* and *Il convivio*, Gilson locates the decisive move away from Thomism in Dante's positing of two final ends, *in duo ultima*, one belonging to the order of nature and the mortal body, the other to the order of grace and the soul. This distinction divorces the two orders of beatitude which St. Thomas had subordinated one to the other. As Gilson says of St. Thomas's imperfect happiness: "If there is a natural felicity in this life, far from constituting a goal distinct from the final goal, it is merely a stepping-stone to it."<sup>5</sup> For Dante the planes of nature and grace run along parallel lines which meet only at God. The natural order of earthly happiness, *beatitudo terrestris*, is governed by reason through the natural virtues, exemplified by the wisdom of the philosophers, and administered by the Emperor whose main responsibility it is to guide his people to their temporal happiness.<sup>6</sup> The order of nature, although admitted by Dante to lead toward an inferior end, is not strictly answer-

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<sup>4</sup>Etienne Gilson, *Dante and Philosophy*, trans. L.K. Shook, C.S.B. (New York: Random House, Inc., 1956), 353.

<sup>5</sup>*Ibid.*, 194, n.2.

<sup>6</sup>*Ibid.*, 197.

able to the dictates of grace and its administrator the Pope, who oversees only the road leading to heavenly happiness, *beatitudo coelestis*, a journey requiring those supernatural virtues and wisdom bestowed by the sacraments and revelation.

Gilson attributes this separation of nature and grace to the direct influence of Aristotle rather than the Latin Averroists, whose influence he discounts as minimal. He argues Dante's reading of the *Nichomachean Ethics* fastened on Aristotle's notion that the happiness of the *polis* is the primary concern for its ruler as directed by the virtue of justice. As Gilson shows, Dante bestows upon political happiness the significance of a final end and directly contradicts the teaching of Aquinas in *De regimine principum*.<sup>7</sup> Dante also subsumes the contemplative's happiness of *Ethics* X to the happiness of the state, in spite of his acknowledgement of its superiority over the happiness of the active life.<sup>8</sup> Suggesting that this interpretation of Aristotle, gleaned at least in part from Aquinas, is authentic,<sup>9</sup> in retrospect, Gilson proceeds to find greater historical innovation in Aquinas's emphasis than is generally acknowledged.<sup>10</sup>

Although Gilson could be challenged on this point, given Dante's version of Aristotle, the contemplative of St. Thomas does appear subversive because of his desire to transcend merely political ends. Seeking cognitive possession of an object outside the world, the contemplative has different grounds for happiness both in this world and the next. It is surprising, then, that Gilson's treatment of happiness in the *Prima secundae* focuses on Aquinas's dynamics of the intellect and the will, specifically on the ability of the will to apprehend and to possess ends without the intellect. Securing the inherent superiority of the contemplative to the active life becomes central to Thomistic accounts of happiness such as Gilson's. The argument for this position rests on the meaning of a rational human nature and the sole ability of an intellectual act to satisfy human desire. Paraphrasing St. Thomas, Gilson writes, "only the intellect is able

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<sup>7</sup>St. Thomas Aquinas, *De regimine principum*, I, 13.

<sup>8</sup>Etienne Gilson, *Dante and Philosophy*, 134, n. 3.

<sup>9</sup>*Ibid.*, 218.

<sup>10</sup>For example, V.J. McGill discusses Aquinas's indebtedness to both Augustine and Plotinus in "The Concept of Transcendent Happiness," *The Idea of Happiness* (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1967), 58-90.

to grasp immediately the object of beatitude and our last end."<sup>11</sup>

Thus, according to Gilson, Dante's mistake is twofold: on the one hand, he has mistakenly conceived of a natural order which exists separately from grace; on the other, he has forgotten that the shape of both happinesses is determined by the intellectual matrix of human nature. Dante, who was nine when Aquinas died, just as Marsilio Ficino and Lorenzo Valla after him, resisted a paradigm of earthly happiness controlled by an educated and spiritual elite. Seeing no such problem, Gilson comments, "so far as St. Thomas Aquinas is concerned, the intellectual virtues are no less the prerogative of man than are the moral virtues."<sup>12</sup> What Gilson affirms as Thomas's undoubted intellectualism on the subject of beatitude, at least eternal beatitude, did not hold out very long against the mainstream of Renaissance thinkers, who preferring to bring happiness to bear on a broader arena of human endeavor, came down in favor of the will and its dynamism toward pleasure and satisfaction.<sup>13</sup> Gilson's own interpretative sympathy to the primacy of contemplation is indicative of both the tenor and limitation of many treatments in contemporary Thomism. Scant attention has been paid to the possibilities presented by Thomas's discussion of imperfect happiness in the context of the life of grace, the beatitudes, and the gifts of the Holy Spirit.

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<sup>11</sup>Etienne Gilson, *The Christian Philosophy of St. Thomas Aquinas*, trans. L.K. Shook, C.S.B. (New York: Random House Inc., 1956), 353. See also *Moral Values and the Moral Life*, trans. Leo Richard Ward (St. Louis: B. Herder Book Co., 1931), chs. 1-2.

<sup>12</sup>Etienne Gilson, *Dante and Philosophy*, 135.

<sup>13</sup>See Agnes Heller, *Renaissance Man*, trans. Richard E. Allen (Boston: Routledge & Keegan Paul, 1978), 282-89; and Charles E. Trinkhaus, Jr. *Adversity's Nobleman: The Italian Humanists on Happiness* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1940).

## II.

St. Thomas's insistence on the role of contemplation in happiness has a more eloquent defender than Gilson. In his *Happiness and Contemplation*, Josef Pieper persuasively advocates a position that could not be more at odds with the modern ethos. Pieper reminds us that it is Thomas's own unusual insistence on the act of contemplation that requires interpreters to pay him strict attention on this point: "What is under discussion here is nothing less than the inner structure of human nature, indeed of the spirit in general and of reality as a whole."<sup>14</sup>

His explanation of Thomas on the relation of the will and intellect in happiness is a masterpiece of apologetics. Pieper begins with the now familiar assertion that happiness cannot possibly exist in an act of the will because it can neither apprehend ends by itself nor possess those ends: both apprehension and possession are acts of the intellect. Happiness is a "having" and a "possession" that fully satisfies the motion of the will toward its whole good--*bonum univemale*.<sup>15</sup> Pieper's description of this distinction shows him to be more sensitive than Gilson to the problem of elitism. By arguing that love itself is dependent upon a cognitive act which makes the *beloved* actually present to the lover, Pieper takes the edge off his intellectualism. He writes, "Only the presence of what is loved makes us happy, and that presence is actualized by the power of cognition."<sup>16</sup> Pieper succeeds in linking contemplation to the "indispensible premise" of love and makes contemplation itself an integral possibility of daily life; his examples range from contemplation of creation, to the mystery of a child's face, to the experience of Gerard Manley Hopkins's poetic *inscape*.

Yet, just as Gilson, Pieper pays little attention to Thomas's own admission that there is an *active felicity* in this life.<sup>17</sup> In fact, his whole discussion is marked by a reluctance to speak of degrees of happiness.

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<sup>14</sup>Josef Pieper, *Happiness and Contemplation*, trans. Richard and Clara Winston (New York: Pantheon Books, Inc., 1958), 61.

<sup>15</sup>*Ibid.*, 32 and 40.

<sup>16</sup>*Ibid.*, 71.

<sup>17</sup>St. Thomas Aquinas, *Summa theologiae*, I-II, q.5, a.4 resp.).

Pieper's analysis of the active life repeats the well-known thesis of his *Leisure: The Basis of Culture* that the realm of practical action, particularly work, points beyond itself, "that it makes arrangements for something else"<sup>18</sup>--namely, the leisurely contemplation of reality itself. Thus the eternal and uninterrupted happiness of the beatific vision can only be presaged by a cognitive act of the mind. Nevertheless, his three points of stress each add significant qualifications to three basic principles of beatitude in St. Thomas: not only intellectualism but also the insistence that happiness is an active state<sup>19</sup> (*operatio*) that excludes all *miseria*.<sup>20</sup>

Pieper describes the activity of earthly contemplation, even as it rises to the intuition of God himself, as a *dark night* which conjoins *repose* and *unrest*.<sup>21</sup> Pieper could have paid more attention to the implications of these remarks since our expectation of immediacy in contemplation can rule out in advance any expectation of suffering. His earlier allusions to the passive facet of contemplation would help him account for the *unrest in repose* along with other affective aspects of his portrayal. The theme of passivity represents a challenge to both the classical and Thomistic views of happiness, both of which go to great lengths in maintaining that happiness consists in activity rather than passion. However, Pieper offers a much-needed nuance to this view in his discussion of the *gift-quality* of happiness, not as a consequence of Aristotelian good fortune, but as the gift of sight to the seer.

In Pieper's language, the act of contemplation becomes "an activity which we receive."<sup>22</sup> *Theoria*, a purely receptive approach to reality,<sup>23</sup> arises from the capacity of the human intellect "to have something outside as an object" of our gaze.<sup>24</sup> Therefore, for Pieper, activity alone cannot raise a person to either perfect or imperfect happiness. Perhaps, even within Thomism, passion and passivity, along with the whole range

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<sup>18</sup>Josef Pieper, *Happiness and Contemplation*, 92.

<sup>19</sup>St. Thomas Aquinas, *Summa theologiae*, I-II, q.3, a.2.

<sup>20</sup>*Ibid.*, I-II, q.5, a.4, *sed contra*.

<sup>21</sup>Josef Pieper, *Happiness and Contemplation*, 108.

<sup>22</sup>*Ibid.*, 57.

<sup>23</sup>*Ibid.*, 73.

<sup>24</sup>*Ibid.*, 42.

of consequent affections, have their place in the process of human perfecting.<sup>25</sup> Pieper begins to offer *pathos* a place within his account by his discussion of love, but it is thwarted by the intellectualism he so deftly underscores in everyday life.

However, a distinction fundamental to love in St. Thomas goes unmentioned in this book--the principle that through an act of the will in loving we draw closer to God than in an act of the intellect or knowledge.<sup>26</sup> Although intellect is essentially superior to the will, it is not superior *in relation* to God, particularly in this life since we lack the *lumen gloriae* through which we are lifted to the vision of God. Aquinas acknowledged that intellectual apprehension of God in this life necessarily scales him down, while love working outwardly from our intellectual appetite preserves His Being. It seems that many of the stresses noted in Pieper could be more richly served if they were developed in the light of this distinction, allowing him greater flexibility to include the happiness of an active life.

### III.

Yves R. Simon disagrees with Pieper's emphasis on leisure and contemplation. In his chapter "Happiness and the Last End" from *Freedom of Choice*, Simon manifests almost no interest in happiness as a contemplative activity; rather, he is more concerned with the overall rationality of the happy life. Happiness, for Simon, is the *end of voluntary action*, and true happiness involves the *real achievement* in satisfying without interruption the tendencies, desires, and inclinations of the whole person for the good.<sup>27</sup> Since all human desires (not solely those of the intellect) extend "in unlimited manner to the whole universe of being and its perfections," any happiness on earth can only be *strongly qualified*.<sup>28</sup> Indeed, Simon's approach is reminiscent of Augustine's restless heart, to which he explicitly alludes, rather than Thomas's intellectual desire to see the vision of God.

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<sup>25</sup>*Ibid.*, 44.

<sup>26</sup>St. Thomas Aquinas, *Summa theologiae*, I, q.82, a.3, resp.

<sup>27</sup>Yves R. Simon, *Freedom of Choice*, ed. Peter Wolff (New York: Fordham University Press, 1987), 48.

<sup>28</sup>*Ibid.*, 53.

Simon, however, is not a voluntarist, as his discussion of practical reasoning makes clear. Means, or what he calls intermediate ends, are necessarily chosen in a teleological process culminating in the final good.<sup>29</sup> If Gilson can claim Book V of the *Ethics* as the key to the Aristotelian account of happiness, and Pieper lays claim to Book X, then Book VI on *phronesis* belongs to Simon. Just as Aristotle, he qualifies his discussion of teleology in a way that accounts for the diversity of claims to what makes a life happy. Concepts such as happiness and goodness each have the character of form in judgment which explains the fact that "Within the same day and of the same man the last end may be placed first in God, then in some good--say, pleasure--then in another created good--say, honor--and in God again."<sup>30</sup> In other words, the final end, which the will necessarily intends, bears both formal and final causality with the implication that the choice of means will eventually shape a person's entire life. Simon's analysis of moral action offers valuable support for the claim that ideas of happiness recommend a way of life.

The happiness of this world, however, is complicated by considerations that do not effect the happiness of heaven. Imperfect happiness is imperfect for the simple reason that in this world we cannot give ourselves totally to God. There always remain the demands of real goods other than God which are necessary to maintenance of our well-being--health, pleasure, knowledge, citizenship, and so on. The temptation for Thomists in offering an intellectualist account of happiness based upon contemplation is to extrapolate from the perfect happiness of the beatific vision to life in this world. In the final chapter of the French edition, only recently published in English, Simon comes as close as any in putting a finger on the difficulty of providing a neat and simple picture of imperfect happiness:

In the present life, God, the last end, is loved in the manner of an intermediate end capable of bringing the soul to the only end which could be, here below, the object of unconditional volition, namely, the bare form of the universal good. In the present life, attachment to God is the result of deliberation and choice....In the present life, the last concrete end shares in the nature of a means, and

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<sup>29</sup>*Ibid.*, 57.

<sup>30</sup>*Ibid.*, 59.

because it is the object of deliberation and choice, it is treated as a means by our intelligence and will.<sup>31</sup>

In other words, God has to compete for our attention in this life; and even the ordinate choice of God does not resolve life's difficulties. The juggling of different intermediate ends, as a means to a final end, goes on until death; but, as Simon shows, God becomes a formal cause of our choosing those intermediary goods, including Himself, while remaining the final cause determining the motion of the will itself. Simon's appeal to the rational teleology of human action is more persuasive, in my opinion, than Pieper's portrayal of earthly contemplation. In Simon's account the life of contemplation is only one option in the ordering of one's whole life toward what is truly final.

Aware of the problems besetting St. Thomas's intellectualist account of happiness, Simon, just as Pieper, turns to the contrast between love and knowledge in order to resolve it. He does not describe knowledge as receptive vision, as in Pieper, but calls it analytical and essential in contrast with love and desire which are concerned with *wholes*.<sup>32</sup> "The formal character attributed to the good, to happiness, and to the last end seems to conflict with the concreteness of whatever is loved or desired."<sup>33</sup> Love has to do with *that which* is loved, and knowledge has to do with *that on account of which* is loved. In our present life the reason that a thing is loved is always an aspect of the thing; thus love, rather than knowledge, offers the greatest possibility of earthly happiness.

Simon fills out the picture of imperfect happiness, along the lines suggested by St. Thomas, by attending to what is implied for the active life by the relation of love and knowledge to God. Thomists need not be condemned to a dark limbo about the happiness of this life, unless they picture it in strict analogy with the happiness of heaven. Simon's brief remarks can prompt one to ask whether or not Thomists are taking full advantage of St. Thomas on this point. Certainly Thomas's unquestioned distinction between the reach of love and the reach of knowledge in this life suggests more that can be said than has been said.

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<sup>31</sup>Yves R. Simon "Law and Liberty," trans. Peter Wolff, *The Review of Politics* (Winter 1990), 115.

<sup>32</sup>Yves R. Simon, *Freedom of Choice*, 66.

<sup>33</sup>*Ibid.*, 67.

## IV.

Against the background of this discussion, Maritain's evocative genius can emerge. Maritain never treated this question at length in the manner of Pieper or even Gilson; but he shares with his student, Yves R. Simon, the desire to broaden the domain of imperfect happiness to include heroic efforts at practical and political living. However, Maritain distinguishes himself even further for a willingness to pay philosophical attention to the role of the affections. His concern for emotional experience is evident in many of the central themes in his thought--connatural knowledge, creative intuition, poetry, spiritual experience, natural mysticism, and sanctity, among others.<sup>34</sup>

What Aristotelians and Thomists call the *passions* may seem strange at first for a man whose chief project in his early career was the "liberation of the intelligence" and the "restoration of the intellect"; yet, in all aspects of his work, from epistemology to aesthetics, Maritain demonstrates how crucial to the reaffirmation of human reason is the simultaneous affirmation of its connection to the body, its sensitive appetite, and the realm of what Freud wrongly labeled "the unconscious." The job of restoring the intellect, Maritain insists, calls for reconnecting it to the wholeness of the human person, rather than isolating the intellect from the body in the manner of a Cartesian angel.

Along with Simon, Maritain admits that our embodied existence makes happiness in this world difficult to describe. His attempt can be seen most prominently in *Integral Humanism* and associated works where he describes what he calls the "temporal task of the Gospel."<sup>35</sup> Maritain's desire to unify culture once again by allowing the spiritual to

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<sup>34</sup>Maritain's interest in the way the *mind is taught by the heart* is apparent as early as 1914 in his first book, *Bergsonian Philosophy and Thomism*, trans. Mabelle L. Andison (New York: Philosophical Library, 1955), 166. Here he also shows his fondness for citing the remark of Pseudo-Dionysius from the *Divine Names* (2.9) to support his theory of connatural knowledge in the spiritual life--*non solum discens, sed et patiens divina* (167). Maritain will continue to refer to this text, especially throughout *The Degrees of Knowledge*, in spite of St. Thomas's own expressed discomfort with it (*De veritate*, q.26, a.3, ad 18).

<sup>35</sup>Jacques Maritain, *Integral Humanism: Temporal and Spiritual Problems of a New Christendom*, trans. Joseph W. Evans (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1968), 42.

vivify the temporal<sup>36</sup> is well known and often criticized, especially for its overtones of political and economic radicalism. While certainly advocating the primacy of the contemplative life, Maritain could not reduce the pursuit of earthly happiness to such a fine point. Just as Simon, he insisted that the meaning of happiness must include the life of the city as well as of the individual, his work as well as his wisdom.

Similar to other Thomists, Maritain carefully preserves the hierarchy of the two happinesses. The happiness that St. Thomas calls "imperfect" and "intermediate," Maritain terms "infravalent."<sup>37</sup> Thus true humanism subordinates the happiness of man's temporal condition to his eternal origin and destiny. In his lectures on *Moral Philosophy* Maritain goes to some length in describing Aristotle's basic error of limiting the end of happiness to a human ideal. As a consequence, Aristotle was unable to distinguish between the object of happiness as a final end and the subject's possession of happiness itself. Christianity, on the other hand, demands that the windows of human subjectivity be opened to an object of happiness outside the human. By implication, the earthly route to happiness must encompass the experience of self-giving and the suffering necessary to achieve it. A parallel can be drawn between Maritain's discussion of the wound that Beatrice inflicts on Dante which releases him from the prison of his self,<sup>38</sup> and the wound that Christianity, according to Maritain, inflicted on Aristotelian philosophy. Aristotle's moral teaching "leaves us enclosed in love of ourselves. It is my good that I love and will in willing and loving Happiness as the supreme Good supremely loved....It is the good which I will *propter me*, for my own sake, for love of myself"; and Maritain concludes, "It is impossible for Aristotelian ethics to escape from the embrace of the self....And yet in the end it is just such a deliverance that we long for."<sup>39</sup>

To describe this earthly happiness in Christian terms is not only more

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<sup>36</sup>*Ibid.*, 112.

<sup>37</sup>*Ibid.*, 179.

<sup>38</sup>Jacques Maritain, *Creative Intuition in Art and Poetry* (New York: Pantheon Books, Inc., 1953), 371.

<sup>39</sup>Jacques Maritain, *Moral Philosophy* (London: Geoffrey Bles, 1964), 49. For an elaboration of this argument see Jacques Maritain, *An Introduction to the Basic Problems of Moral Philosophy*, trans. Cornelia N. Borgerhoff (Albany: Magi Books, 1990).

cumbersome than eternal happiness, it is also more difficult to attain.<sup>40</sup> The same "anguish of beatitude" which outstrips the ability of discursive reason to explain makes the happy life in this world a great deal more than the cultivation of contentment.<sup>41</sup> While Maritain associates the experience of anguish with earthly beatitude, he elsewhere chastises Kierkegaard for importing "anguish" into the philosophical vocabulary from the language of religion. "As a philosophical category," explains Maritain, "anguish is worthless....It is in the philosopher, not in his philosophy."<sup>42</sup> Maritain's inconsistency reveals the challenge facing Thomistic accounts of earthly happiness, at least those that would conceive of it as an activity and passion of love. The suffering and the passion of love appear to violate the Thomistic canons of activity, contemplation, pleasure, and possession in happiness. Nonetheless, Maritain can be admired for breaking his own rules, so to speak, by discussing the progress and "law of creative conflict" that he sees within suffering a movement toward "higher forms of peace and transfiguring integration."<sup>43</sup>

The perfecting of the human person in this life is not achieved without its agony, nor should it be. Who, it may be asked, is Maritain warning when he tells the Christian not "to take for his pillow the very love which he has received"?<sup>44</sup> Does Maritain have in mind the bourgeois in his repose, or the contemplative in his? The reason his view of earthly happiness embraces the active as well as the contemplative lives is that the happy are the sanctified, and neither is satisfied with anything less than the transformation of the temporal order. Of course, such a transformation can only be partial, but the saints suffer the difference. Their suffering transformed into a "closed secret" of a superior good is the good uniting them to God in this life.<sup>45</sup>

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<sup>40</sup>*Ibid.*, 85.

<sup>41</sup>Jacques Maritain, *Integral Humanism*, 56.

<sup>42</sup>Jacques Maritain, *Existence and the Existent*, trans. Lewis Galantiere and Gerald B. Phelan (New York: Pantheon Books, Inc., 1948), 145.

<sup>43</sup>Jacques Maritain, *Integral Humanism*, 56. For an important development of this theme in both Augustine and Aquinas, see Nicholas Wolterstorff, "Suffering Love," in *Philosophy and the Christian Faith*, ed. Thomas V. Morris (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1988), 196-237.

<sup>44</sup>Jacques Maritain, *Integral Humanism*, 55.

<sup>45</sup>Jacques Maritain, *Moral Philosophy*, 461.

In the classical world some philosophers taught that misery destroys happiness; others taught that a man could be happy while roasting in the *Bull of Phalaris*. Maritain stretches the limits of philosophical discourse by imagining the relation of happiness and pain in a different way. Pain neither cancels happiness as it does pleasure, nor remains dissociated from the tranquil *apatheia* of the mind girded by virtue. It belongs to the inherent grammar of a life at once fully engaged in pursuit of the two happinesses rather than one.