Please join us for this week's History of Philosophy Works-in-Progress Luncheon! This week's presenter is Huimin Liu (Philosophy, University of Notre Dame), who will present on, "'Conceive One Without the Other': Spinoza on Real Distinction" (see abstract below).
Each meeting consists of a presentation by a graduate student, visiting scholar, or faculty member on a project that they are working on in the history of philosophy, followed by a period of comments/questions from other participants. The workshop is designed to give contributors the opportunity to develop ideas and receive helpful feedback on projects/papers in a friendly and low stakes environment.
Lunch is provided for registered attendees.
Abstract: In the context of Spinoza’s monism, commentators have long struggled to explain why Spinoza considers the distinction between different attributes of the only divine substance as a real distinction (E1p10s). In this paper, I argue that the difficulty arises from a general misunderstanding of Spinoza’s concept of real distinction. Despite their apparent similarity, Spinoza’s understanding of real distinction differs significantly from that of his predecessors, particularly Descartes. The difference becomes most evident in Spinoza’s interpretation of the criterion for real distinction, which he inherited from Descartes: “Two things are really distinct if one can be conceived without the other, and vice versa.” Descartes understands this criterion to mean that two things are really distinct from each other if, even though the concept of one does not involve the concept of the other positively, it does involve the concept of the other negatively. On the other hand, Spinoza interprets the criterion as stating that one thing is really distinct from another if the concept of one does not include the concept of the other, whether positively or negatively. This new understanding of real distinction has significant implications. Firstly, it breaks the traditional link between real distinction and separability between relata. Secondly, it allows for real distinction to even be compatible with numerical identity. As a result, this new understanding of real distinction not only helps explain why Spinoza considers the distinction between different attributes of the only substance as a real distinction but also helps clarify the relationship between parallel modes under different attributes.
Originally published at historyofphilosophy.nd.edu.